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PART I: 
EXTENDED ABSTRACT 

Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with conceptual coherence and continuity in and of 
knowledgeable participation in everyday activity. To better illustrate the nature of the 
phenomena that are of interest, and to frame the question that the thesis addresses in 
most general terms, I begin this introduction with an account of an episode of learning 
by a young child. I then use this learning episode to formulate the general purpose of 
the thesis. In the remainder of the chapter, I provide a brief introduction to the 
relevant research literature on the problem of coherence and continuity in the 
cognitive and the learning sciences, and I outline some of the basic tenets of an 
ecological (sociocultural and situative) analytical approach. I then list the specific 
research questions that the thesis addresses and outline the structure of the thesis and 
the empirical studies included. 
An episode of learning 
Clara is two and a half years old and greatly enjoys drawing and 
painting. Since she was very small, her parents encouraged her to 
color, scribble, and doodle on blank pages, and many of her paintings 
hang on her house’s walls. Often, she asks her parents to draw figures 
for her, such as animals, landscapes, flowers, and the like—figures 
that she cannot yet draw on her own. Lately, her parents have begun 
to show her how to draw geometric shapes. They take her hand as she 
holds the crayon, and they guide her to draw circles and squares on 
the paper while they say “See, Clara, we draw circles!” or “Look 
there, that’s a square.” One afternoon, Clara is sitting with her dad, 
ready to draw some random lines on the paper, when she wonders 
(aloud) what they could paint. Clara then spontaneously begins to 
draw an elliptical shape. Suddenly, she looks at the shape and, with an 
expression of great surprise in her face, says, ”Look, Daddy, it’s a 
troll!” She then draws two circles that can now clearly be recognized 
as the troll’s eyes, and then the nose and the mouth. Her dad then 
encourages her to continue drawing the troll’s ears (in red color, 
Figure 1) and hair. Clara has just drawn her first (“troll”) face. 
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Figure 1: Clara’s first drawing of a (troll’s) face 
I documented the episode described above two years ago while I was drawing with 
my daughter, Clara. This episode is one of many remarkable but mundane events that 
have occurred in the course of Clara’s cognitive and literacy development, and which 
I have been lucky enough to witness and document in situ. Whereas the episode does 
not feature any particularly advanced technology, nor takes place as part of an 
inquiry-based curriculum—the empirical context of this dissertation—the episode is 
relevant to this thesis because it raises questions of learning and development: of how 
prior experiences relate to the development of new literacy skills, and of how the 
immediate context of bodily engagement is involved in such development. The 
episode is also important because, along with the empirical materials presented in this 
study, it forms part of a larger set of experiences and observations that have been 
influential in my work. Thus, this and other similar episodes that I have documented 
throughout my daughter’s development have been important resources throughout my 
doctoral studies, and many of the things that I have subsequently paid attention to, 
talked about, and written about with regard to learning and cognition became salient 
during discussions about episodes such as this one with my colleagues and 
supervisors in the project. 
In this episode, Clara draws a face for the first time (Figure 1). Importantly, the 
episode is not an isolated event, disconnected from Clara’s developmental history. 
The drawing in Figure 1 is the first of many different faces that she is capable of 
drawing today, two and a half years later. As Clara drew her first face, a new horizon 
of possibilities opened up for her and changed her forever—she would never again be 
the little girl who could not intentionally draw a face. But how did this event of 
development come about? On what grounds did she come to master a skill that she 
lacked before? How can we understand this event of change as being continuous with 
Clara’s prior and subsequent history of developing literacy in pictorial representation 
and, therefore, of intellectual development? 
Most current approaches to learning and cognition explain episodes of change such as 
the one described above in terms of “prior knowledge,” which is most often described 
as an already existing intellectual, formal, or linguistic competence—such as an 
“idea”—that has been acquired from everyday experience. Accordingly, knowing 
something new “begins with the selection of ideas from everyday experience” 
(Roschelle, 1995, p. 41). From that perspective, Clara was already learning to draw 
circles, so she knew circles. She already knew how to hold the crayon and draw 
circle-like shapes with it. She already knew faces and she already knew trolls. All 
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these she knew not just by herself, but thanks to the social interactions in which she 
had previously engaged with her parents, where she had been presented with drawing, 
faces, and trolls. It was these already existing “ideas” that allowed—in a sense, 
caused—her to draw first, and then to recognize her drawing as a troll’s face. 
Yet, some aspects of Clara’s episode seem to be left unexplained by an account that 
takes “prior knowledge” as the primary ground of the developmental event. First, 
there is no evidence that Clara is intentionally “selecting” from prior “ideas” what she 
will end up drawing or how she will come to recognize it later on. Rather than out of 
previously knowing some thing, everything in the episode suggests that Clara’s 
drawing of a troll’s face comes to her as an absolute surprise. She begins to move her 
hand over the blank sheet at the same time as she wonders aloud about what she 
should draw. She does not anticipate the outcome of her drawing. Indeed, she could 
not anticipate it because she did not yet know that she could draw a troll’s face by 
herself. How could she intend what she did not yet know? Rather, Clara was able to 
do something before knowing (intellectually) that she could do it. More than an 
intellectual understanding about drawing troll faces, there was prior bodily 
knowledge: the knowledge by means of which Clara’s hand moved and left a 
particular shape on the sheet. There was also her bodily and sensorial capability of 
being affected by the shape that she had just left, the capability of perceiving the 
drawing as a face and letting herself be surprised by it. All these aspects seem to play 
an important role in her coming to be someone who can draw faces and, therefore, in 
her development of these literacy skills. But bodily and affective dimensions, such as 
a learner’s body movements or her sudden surprise, are seldom investigated in the 
context of science and mathematics education (cf. Roth, 2010, 2011). Yet, there are 
studies showing that early bodily and apparently non-rational skills such as scribbling 
are fundamental to toddlers’ development of symbolic communication (e.g., 
Stamatopoulou, 2011?5 Such studies also show that Clara’s episode is not just 
incidental and particular to my daughter’s history, but is also an instance of a more 
general aspect of the development of literacy skills. 
Another aspect that makes problematic the idea that previously learned “ideas”—e.g., 
the idea of “the circle,” the idea of a “troll’s face,” or the “image schema” of “drawing 
a circle”—are the most fundamental ground on which the episode takes place is that 
the event itself does not seem to be determinable by any given idea (form), but is 
rather open-ended and indeterminate. It is rather difficult to locate the idea of “troll 
face” in a single participant or aspect of the setting. Thus, Clara’s drawing begins with 
an indeterminate shape on the blank sheet that, at some point, comes to be named as a 
troll. It is only after the first shape is recognized as such that the drawing actually 
begins to take the form of a face. And yet, what the form comes to be is not 
determinate either. First there is just an elliptical trace. Then eyes, nose, and mouth 
are added; finally hair and ears. In this process of form making, of achieving a sense 
of coherence, the act of drawing and the act of naming the drawing are not one and 
the same, but both seem to form part of the bringing the event to closure. Thus, Clara 
articulates her surprise not only to herself but also to her father. In doing so, she 
provides resources for them both to turn what initially was a random shape on a blank 
sheet into something that can be recognized as a coherent troll face by others as well. 
Episodes such as the one described above highlight aspects that are unaccounted for 
in current theories of learning that reify rational knowledge structures as the ground of 
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continuity and coherence in intellectual development. The episode suggests that 
aspects that are more often associated with irrational or non-intellectual dimensions of 
life, such as the way we move and come into contact with our immediate material 
context, as well as the way we are overwhelmed and surprised in experience, may be 
important for understanding how we come to talk and reason about the world. Even if 
intellectual aspects are important—obviously Clara needed to have some intellectual 
competences to think and to talk about faces and trolls—these cannot be thought of as 
having a determinate form that somehow structures action. If there are ideas—
whether social or individual—underlying the event, they do not seem to be at the 
origin, but rather seem to be part of a larger unfolding process that cannot be reduced 
to either the initial idea or the final product. Instead, to understand how “prior 
knowledge” is involved in the development of new intellectual skills, we need to 
investigate and theorize knowing not as determinate and formal, but as fluid and 
open-ended, and as connected to actual engagement with others and with materials. 
Problem statement and purpose of the thesis 
In this thesis, I investigate the emergent, social, and performative aspects of engaging 
with materials that are salient during episodes of literacy development such as the one 
described above. Specifically, the problem investigated in this thesis is: 
• How do relations of conceptual coherence and continuity emerge as practical and 
embodied achievements during joint social activities?  
The purpose of the thesis is to provide empirical and analytical accounts of conceptual 
coherence and continuity—which I investigate in the context of science education in 
general and of inquiry-based instruction in particular. The formulation of conceptual 
coherence and continuity as practical and embodied achievements derives from a 
situative and sociocultural analytical perspective, according to which intellectual 
cognitive skills, rather than being the result of private individual mental operations, 
emerge first as material operations between people participating in particular social 
practices (e.g., schooling practices). Throughout three empirical studies, I draw on 
video recordings and other ethnographic materials collected as part of a larger design-
based research project concerned with developing and testing a computer-supported 
inquiry-based learning curriculum on the topic of “energy of the future.” In the 
studies, I analyze how teachers and students together draw connections of significance 
among events, the teaching materials, and the core topics of the science curriculum. 
To establish the grounds on which the present investigation of conceptual coherence 
and continuity is built, I begin by introducing a broad division between two main 
currents of thought that have dominated research on learning and cognition during the 
past century, cognitivist and ecological (sociocultural and situative) approaches. I then 
position my work as forming part of the latter kind and elaborate on some basic 
implications that derive from taking an ecological perspective on the problem of 
coherence and continuity in experience. 
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Towards a genetic and ecological account of coherence and 
continuity 
Information-processing approaches 
When information-processing approaches emerged during the second half of the last 
century (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin; Miller, 1956), thinking and learning were 
conceptualized as the mental manipulation of symbols. Since then, and throughout the 
following constructivist interpretations of learning as the learners’ active construction 
of mental models and conceptions (Greeno, Collins, & Resnick, 1996; Mayer, 1996), 
accounts of how learners achieve a coherent understanding of the world during and 
across learning situations have most often been articulated in terms of rational 
connections between mental knowledge structures or representations (e.g., symbols, 
conceptions, ideas, schemas, models). This is particularly the case in research on 
learning transfer, where a learner’s ability to recognize a new problem-solving 
situation as belonging to a particular class of situations experienced before—e.g., 
recognizing the cycles of evaporation and condensation inside of a heat pump as an 
instance of a transforming thermodynamic system—is a function of structural 
alignments or mappings between mental representations of the knowledge domain on 
the one hand, and of the current problem-solving situation on the other (Chi & 
VanLehn, 2012; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Reed, Ernst, & 
Banerji, 1974; Singley & Anderson, 1989). In science education, the influence of 
these models has led to a long tradition of conceptual change studies, where 
researchers investigate the nature and content of learners’ prior ideas or conceptions, 
and how instruction may facilitate learners drawing rational connections between 
those prior “everyday” or “naïve” ideas and the ideas that scientific experts hold 
(diSessa, 2006; Vonsniadou, 2008; Treagust & Duit, 2008). Common to these 
approaches is the view that the competence of recognizing and producing rational 
order during situated action rests upon the existence of already developed individual 
mental structures or “prior knowledge,” which analysts can identify through diverse 
methods of observation and then treat as antecedent conditions to explain the 
observed ordered and ordering behaviors. 
Ecological approaches 
During the last decades, researchers from a number of approaches, including situated 
cognition (Clancey, 1997; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Suchman, 1987), socio-cultural-
historical psychology (Cole, 1995; Engeström, 1987; Säljö, 2000; Wertsch, 1991), 
and distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995), have raised the criticism that the 
cognitivist accounts described above entail a decontextualized stance towards human 
activity, where rational thinking is divorced from the bodily, sensual, affective, and 
direct experience of everyday engagement with others and with materials. In 
particular, the view that situated action can be accounted for by distinguishing an 
individual’s knowledge representations on the one hand, and the implementation of 
such representations in behavior on the other, has been problematized. Anchored in 
philosophical and scientific traditions such as phenomenology (e.g., Husserl, 
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1946/1981), American pragmatism (e.g., Dewey, 1938; Mead, 1934), cultural-
historical psychology (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978), and ecological psychology (Gibson, 
1979) among others, these emerging ecological1 approaches reject the analytical 
divisions between mind and body, and between people and their cultural and material 
contexts, that characterize traditional cognitivist approaches. Instead, they propose to 
study the mutually constitutive relations that bind together subjects and their social 
and material environments during situated action. 
Ecological approaches give analytical primacy to social practices, which both 
produce and are produced by individuals’ situated and embodied actions (Lave, 
1988). Cognitive phenomena such as learning and thinking are seen as emergent 
properties of the larger social process of participating in particular sociocultural 
practices. Becoming a participant in social practices such as schooling, in turn, is 
viewed as a process that involves mastering historically developed cultural tools—
such as language, mathematical techniques, scientific reasoning, and inscriptional 
practices—during engagement in concrete activities (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Mercer 
& Littleton, 2007; Roth & McGinn, 1998; Wertsch & Kazak, 2011). It is through the 
process of participating in social practices that such cognitive functions as perceiving, 
thinking, learning, or arguing emerge: first as a social relation in the plane of social 
interaction, and then as a cognitive function in the individual (Vygotsky, 1978).  
Ecological approaches have increasingly been adopted in what some researchers refer 
to as the “practice turn” in educational research (Arnseth, 2008, p. 289). In science 
education research, this turn has involved the emergence of empirical studies 
documenting episodes of conceptual change as achievements of social—rather than 
psychological—order (e.g., Furberg & Arnseth, 2009; Krange & Ludvigsen, 2008; 
Lindwall & Lymer, 2008; Roth et al., 1997). Methodologically, an interest in learning 
as social practice has involved a proliferation of video-based ethnographic studies 
aimed to capture the situated social practices by means of which students and teachers 
jointly make sense of learning situations in the moment-by-moment interaction (Derry 
et al., 2010). Results from these studies suggest that there is more to learning science 
than knowing or constructing mental knowledge structures: a large part of the 
students’ activities in the science classroom are oriented towards practical concerns 
that, more than the deployment of already learned conceptual knowledge structures, 
reflect an everyday competence of participating in institutional practices of schooling.  
Two analytical implications of an ecological approach 
In this thesis, I take an ecological approach to studying how relations of conceptual 
coherence connecting events, artifacts, and topics in and across situations emerge as 
                                                
 
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term ecological, as Clancey (1997) and Robbins and Aydede 
(2009) do, to refer to a set of otherwise diverse approaches to learning and cognition that share as their 
object of study a postulation of the mutually constitutive relations between subjects and their social and 
material environments. Other researchers have used other terms to refer to the same group of 
approaches. Greeno, Collins, and Resnick (1996), for example, use the label situative/pragmatic-socio-
historic, whereas Sawyer and Greeno (2009) and Greeno and Engeström (2014) refer to them as 
situative approaches. 
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achievements of social practice. Whereas classical cognitivist approaches to these 
questions have been challenged on both empirical and theoretical grounds during the 
last decades (e.g., Lave, 1988; Lobato, 2003), an important challenge in current 
research and theorizing is to account for the competence to perceive or structure 
dissimilar situations as involving the same general conceptual aspects—that is, the 
classical question of transfer—while acknowledging the inherently social and context-
bound nature of cognition (Clancey, 1997; 2011; Greeno & Engeström, 2014; Sfard, 
1998, 2008).  
Two interlocked analytical implications that derive from choosing an ecological 
approach are of particular relevance to the purposes of this thesis. The first 
implication is that the coherence and continuity of any set of ideas or concepts, as 
made relevant by the participants during joint activity, cannot be analyzed in terms of 
a priori formal properties of either the material setting (e.g., texts, graphs, 
demonstrations) or the individuals’ thinking (e.g., a learner’s mental representations 
of texts, graphs, or demonstrations), but must be treated as the result of material and 
practical operations that involve both. This is in line with Vygotsky’s (1978) basic 
premise that any higher cognitive function exists as a relation between people before 
it becomes an individual function. For Vygotsky, as for pragmatists such as George H. 
Mead (1934), higher-order cognitive functions—such as those involved in the use of 
linguistic or conceptual forms during scientific inquiry—are not the precondition for 
the conscious experience of coherence during action. Rather, “the social act is the 
precondition of it” (p. 18). Accordingly, in this thesis I follow the premise that any 
“two events are ‘simultaneous’ if they are included within one and the same act of 
observation” (Dewey, 1929, p. 145, emphasis added). In the context of research in 
inquiry-based instruction, this implies that the analytical task is to describe those 
practical “acts of observation” by means of which teachers and students come to treat 
any two or more aspects (e.g., an event in a laboratory experiment on the one hand, 
and a scientific law as formulated in a science textbook on the other) as being 
formally connected.  
Research consistent with this premise can be found, for example, in 
ethnomethodologically informed studies of scientific practice (e.g., Garfinkel, Lynch, 
& Livingston, 1981; Latour & Woolgar, 1986), which describe “the local historicity” 
of the scientist’s “embodied shop practices” (Garfinkel et al., 1981, p. 132) by means 
of which newly discovered phenomena, such as the “optical pulsar,” are made visible 
and accountable during scientific work. In science education, research informed by 
these and other related situative and sociocultural frameworks has begun to document 
how cognitive skills relevant to science education, such as reading scientific 
inscriptions (e.g., data tables, graphs) (Roth & McGinn, 1998; Wu & Krajcik, 2006) 
or interpreting laboratory experiments (Bergqvist & Säljö, 1994; Lindwall & Lymer, 
2008), involve the joint practical and discursive work of teachers and students during 
social interaction, which produces and stabilizes patterned and disciplined ways of 
perceiving and talking about the material features of the setting. 
The second implication is that, by virtue of conceiving conceptual coherence and 
continuity as achievements of social order, the object of study cannot be the final 
outcome of the social interaction (i.e., the already established connection), but must 
include the process of development that leads to such order. This premise finds an 
intellectual anchor in cultural-historical psychology, particularly in the work of Lev S. 
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Vygotsky (1986/2012), who understood that, to analyze the emergence of cognitive 
functions and intentions in individuals, we need to take a historical and genetic 
approach to the relation between individuals and their social and material contexts. 
From this perspective, the minimal object of interest cannot be the initial situation, in 
which an individual does not yet master a particular cognitive competence, nor can it 
be the final outcome, when the individual already masters it. The minimal 
phenomenon of interest needs to be the process by means of which new intellectual 
competences emerge in and through collective social interactions. In the context of 
studying continuity and coherence, therefore, the analytical focus needs to be on how 
both individuals and settings change so as to lead to particular renderings of ordered 
and connected objects. Such an approach requires a shift away from what Vygotsky 
calls an analysis into elements, and toward a method of analysis into units. Whereas 
the former treats the different aspects of social practice as analytically separable 
elements that analysis must bring together to account for events of social order, the 
latter aims at retaining all the mutually constitutive relations of the basic properties of 
the whole. 
Research questions 
In the previous section, I briefly introduced the historical context of research in the 
cognitive and the learning sciences, and I outlined some basic tenets of an ecological 
approach to the problem of coherence and continuity. Here, I state the two research 
questions that this thesis aims to address in the context of computer-supported 
inquiry-based learning. Importantly, the two questions are interrelated and must be 
understood as necessarily complementing each other (under the analytical premises of 
this study, either one would not make sense without the other). 
The first research question is analytical: 
• What characterizes a unit of analysis capable of accounting for the emergent and 
indeterminate character of intellectual understandings of coherence and 
continuity during joint activities? 
To understand how learners’ own actions during bodily engagement can bring about 
unexpected possibilities and transform them in ways that bring about new 
competences, we cannot start from individual knowledge, because what is already 
known cannot be the ground on which the radically new—and therefore unforeseeable 
and unknown—grows. To capture the emergent and transformational dimensions of 
learning, it is necessary to expand the unit of analysis. In this dissertation, I do so in 
two interlocked ways. First, consistent with the ideas sketched above about the 
primacy of social practice, and in line with other research in science education from 
ecological approaches, I take the collective as the minimal unit of analysis. Social 
relations, and not individual cognitive processes, are the site and source of 
development (Vygotsky, 1978). However, to understand episodes of development as 
phenomena of change, and not as phenomena where what already is known by 
individuals (i.e., prior knowledge) is only repeated or combined, we need to have a 
unit of analysis that captures the unfolding of time as something internal to the 
phenomenon (Roth & Jornet, 2013). Accordingly, and drawing from Dewey’s 
writings on the notion of experience (e.g., Dewey, 1934/2008a), I expand the unit of 
analysis in this second way: it includes not just a social relation—which may be 
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captured by linguistic categories such as a “relation of power”—but a changing social 
relation. I refer to this minimal unit of collective change as transactional. 
The second research question is empirical: 
• How is everyday bodily engagement related to the achievement of conceptual 
coherence and continuity during and across inquiry activities?  
I use the term engagement to mark an interest in whole persons-in-context, rather than 
in just their ideas, utterances, mental schemas and intentions, or any other category 
that reduces to the intellectual the fullness of life that is involved in thinking and 
doing during situated action. The object of study is the performed act (Bakhtin, 1993), 
and not “the psychic process” (p. 38). I use the modifiers everyday and bodily to mark 
the emergent, spontaneous, and embodied aspects of everyday involvement with the 
social and material world. In the same way, my interest is not in the body as an aspect 
that is isolated or distinct from concrete activity or from the cultural forms, such as 
language, that such concrete activities bring about. The unity of body, action, and 
culture is both a premise and an object of investigation in this dissertation. In this 
regard, I follow closely situated cognition approaches and consider the “lived-in 
world of engagement in everyday activity” as both the source of cultural practice and 
the proper site for the study of its emergence (Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991).  
I use the notions of coherence and continuity to address the sense-making practices by 
means of which relations of signification are established within and across contexts 
and situations. Although these terms may be used interchangeably, coherence is a 
more encompassing term in that it denotes the achievement of order, whether within 
or across a given problematic or situation. The term continuity refers more explicitly 
to the achievement of coherence across settings and activities, which has been 
traditionally investigated as the question of transfer. In the empirical studies included 
in this thesis, I investigate conceptual coherence and continuity by analyzing student-
student and teacher-student interactions in different computer-supported inquiry-
based settings involving different technological tools. These include both hands-on 
activities in small groups of students and plenary sessions in classroom settings, and 
they involve the use of hands-on analogs, interactive visualizations, digital video tools 
for capturing and displaying experimentations, and web-based platforms for sharing 
information. 
Outline of the thesis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the development of theoretical and 
empirical accounts of the (mutually constitutive) relation between everyday bodily 
engagement and the emergence of conceptual coherence and continuity during 
situated activity in general, and during computer-supported inquiry-based activities in 
particular. To that aim, throughout this dissertation I develop two main thematic 
threads, each one reflected in each of the two research questions formulated above, 
namely the question of a unit of analysis capable of capturing the transforming 
person-in-setting as she changes during situated action, and the question of the role of 
the body in the constitution of lived-in, meaningful, coherent experience.  
The thesis is divided into two parts: the Extended Abstract (Part I) and the Studies 
(Part II). The Extended Abstract includes five chapters, including this introduction. In 
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Chapter 2, I address the question of unit of analysis by reviewing the ways in which 
existing analytical approaches investigate the problem of coherence and continuity in 
the learning and the cognitive sciences. In the review, I present detailed accounts of 
two representative empirical studies in a sub-field of particular interest to this thesis, 
learning transfer. This allows me to discuss the premises and units of analysis (i.e., 
methodologies) by means of which distinct approaches construct their objects of 
research by referring to concrete materials rather than to more abstract theoretical 
discussions. It also allows me to frame the discussion on unit of analysis in the 
context of the transactional perspective that scholars such as Vygotsky and Dewey 
laid down, and on which this thesis draws. Building on such discussion, in Chapter 3, 
I elaborate on the transactional perspective, a methodological approach to study 
coherence and continuity as phenomena of development, and to account for how talk 
and the performative aspects of interaction are internal aspects of such development. 
In Chapter 4, I present the research design and methods. In Chapter 5, I summarize 
the results of the empirical studies that are included as part of this thesis and elaborate 
on the theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions that the studies 
provide with particular reference to the fields of inquiry-based learning and science 
education. 
Part II consists of the three studies on which the thesis is based. In study I, the focus is 
on discussing and elaborating a unit of analysis capable of addressing change as the 
minimal unit of analysis. The unit is applied to describe an episode of transfer in a 
computer-supported inquiry-based setting where a small group of students is working 
with a set of digital simulations as part of a longer trajectory of inquiry activities. In 
the analyses, my co-authors and I describe important cognitive processes involved in 
transfer, including recognition, analogical inference, and applying conceptual 
knowledge to a problem-solving situation, as collective and emergent bodily 
achievements. Study II investigates how a group of students works with multiple 
analog and digital learning materials that, from the perspective of the curriculum 
designers, represent a common underlying phenomenon and bear iconic and 
conceptual connections. Taking the perspective of the learners instead, the study 
examines how connections of signification emerge as a function of the students’ 
bodily and social engagement with the learning materials. Study III investigates the 
achievement of continuity across inquiry activities in the context of video-supported 
plenary classroom sessions designed to offer opportunities for the students to reflect 
in conceptual terms on prior hands-on activities. I analyze how bodily performances 
and material arrangements in the classroom are involved in the teacher’s work to 
facilitate the emergence of conceptual accounts of prior experiences. 
• Study I: Jornet, A., Roth, W.-M., & Krange, I. (submitted). A transactional 
approach to transfer episodes. Journal of the Learning Sciences. 
 
• Study II: Jornet, A., & Roth, W.-M. (in press). The joint work of 
connecting multiple (Re)presentations in science classrooms. Science 
Education. 
 
 
• Study III: Jornet, A. (submitted). Bodily performances of coherence 
facilitation: The role of the body during teacher questioning in science 
classrooms. Journal of Research in Science Teachin 
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Chapter 2 – Prior Research on 
Coherence and Continuity 
In the introductory chapter, I introduced a distinction between two general approaches 
to learning and cognition: cognitivist and ecological. In discussing these two 
approaches, I pointed out that much research in the cognitive and the learning 
sciences begins from the premise that, for individuals to make sense of an event or 
object of experience in a coherent sense, they require a knowledge representation (i.e., 
prior knowledge) that precedes and makes it possible to perceive and conceive of the 
particular event or object in a meaningful way. Through analysis of a concrete episode 
in which a child was just learning to draw a face for the first time, and citing the wider 
discussions that both cognitivist and ecological approaches have brought up in the 
literature, I problematized the premise of prior knowledge as the most fundamental 
unit on which a coherent understanding of the world emerges during everyday 
activity.  
In this chapter, my aim is to review how questions of conceptual coherence and 
continuity have been addressed in the literature. In doing so, I focus on the different 
premises and units of analysis that have emerged to address the limitations of the so-
called classical transfer paradigm. Focusing on both premises and units of analysis 
rather than on empirical findings alone is important because, as has been established 
in contemporary philosophy of science, there is interdependence between the 
theoretical assumptions that lead to particular observational procedures on the one 
hand, and the empirical observations themselves on the other (e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 
1994; Quine, 1993). Accordingly, “the most empirical ‘technical’ choices cannot be 
disentangled from the most ‘theoretical’ choices in the construction of the [scientific] 
object” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 225). I use the notion of theoretical technologies (Dewey, 
1929; Sørensen, 2009) to refer to the instrumental interdependence between premises 
and units of analysis in characterizing the particular scientific objects of empirical 
research. Different theoretical technologies lead to different scientific objects, which 
in turn may lead to different and sometimes incompatible conclusions about what 
learning is and how it can be recognized in any given set of empirical data (Säljö, 
2009). Prior discussions on the questions of continuity and coherence have shown that 
solving the theoretical and methodological questions that are of pertinence to this 
thesis requires an acknowledgement of the framing assumptions on which claims 
about empirical evidence are made (Greeno, 1997; Sfard, 2008). 
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In the following, I elaborate on how different theoretical technologies are put to work 
in specific empirical studies that are explicitly aimed to address the problematic of 
prior knowledge in the study of coherence and continuity. I first introduce the 
problematic as it has been raised in research on learning transfer. Research on 
learning transfer is particularly relevant to this thesis because it addresses the 
questions of both coherence and continuity; it investigates how knowledge relates to 
knowledge on the one hand, and how the same knowledge structure can be said to be 
present across different contexts/situations on the other. I then provide a detailed 
account of two studies that are representative of two alternate frameworks—
constructivist and ecological. This detailed account allows me to identify and discuss 
how specific scientific objects emerge by reference to the concrete analytical work 
rather than by reference to scholastic discussion alone. I conclude the chapter by 
providing a critical assessment of the two studies in particular, and of the 
constructivist and ecological strands in general, with regard to the aim of addressing 
achievements of conceptual coherence as emergent and context-bound phenomena. 
Coherence and the problem of representation 
In this section, I first introduce the classical view or paradigm that has dominated 
research on the questions of coherence and continuity during most of the last century. 
Then I provide a brief account of the empirical and theoretical challenges that more 
recent literature has raised with regard to the classical perspective. 
The classical view 
Learning transfer is one of the oldest problems in the cognitive and the learning 
sciences, with studies about the topic appearing early during the twentieth century 
(Judd, 1908; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). The question continues to be the object 
of much debate and research today, as two recent special issues of two influential 
journals demonstrate (Engle, 2012; Goldstone & Day, 2012). In broad terms, transfer 
refers to the “ability of individuals to ‘treat a new concept, problem, or phenomenon 
as similar to one(s) they have experienced before’” (Chi & VanLehn, 2012).  
From the information-processing perspective that dominated research on transfer 
during most of the second half of the last century, transfer is the result of a process of 
structural correspondences between abstract mental representations (e.g., Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983; Reed, 1993). According to this view, bodily and situated experiences 
in the world are encoded and stored in abstract symbolic form in mental memory 
systems (Vera & Simon, 1993). Importantly, these representations, and the situations 
they represent, are seen as being constituted by two kinds of substances or structures. 
On the one hand, representations have a surface structure, which consisting of the 
“literal objects, concepts, or entities” that are “explicit” in a situation (Chi & 
VanLehn, 2012, p. 178). On the other hand, they have a deep structure, a “structured 
syntax” (Day & Goldstone, 2012, p. 154) that connects the surface objects into 
coherent, systematic wholes. According to this view, the ability to act on a new 
problem situation in terms of a previously known “type” of problem situation, despite 
the differences in surface (context-bound) features, depends on the ability to perceive 
the deep, context-free structure (e.g., Singley & Anderson, 1989; Gentner & 
Markman, 1997).  
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Building on these premises, researchers during the seventies and eighties investigated 
learning transfer in experimental laboratory studies in which participants first learned 
to solve a problem or set of problems, then were presented a second problem that was, 
to the eyes of the experimenters, isomorphic in its conceptual or “deep structure,” but 
different in its “surface features” (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Reed, Ernst, & 
Banerji, 1974). This research tradition, however, has been the object of much critique 
during the last decades on both empirical and theoretical grounds. 
Empirical challenges to the classical view 
Challenges to the view sketched above have emerged on several empirical grounds. 
First, most experimental studies conducted within the transfer paradigm failed to 
show spontaneous transfer of the problem-solving skills learned during the initial task 
into the second task, which, in the view of the researchers, was isomorphic in its 
“deep structure” but different in its “surface features.” Most often, participants 
transferred what they had learned in prior situations most readily when the problems 
shared surface features, or when they were explicitly prompted by the researchers to 
draw connections between the two situations (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Reed, 
1987). The finding that the surface commonalities between cases are the strongest 
driving force in succeeding during transfer tasks, which Day and Goldstone (2012) 
summarize as being “by far the most robust finding” (p. 154) in transfer research, has 
come to be known as the failure-to-transfer paradox (Chi & VanLehn, 2012; 
Detterman, 1993; Lave, 1988). The paradox lies in the contradiction between the 
premise that transfer depends upon the identification (conscious or subconscious) of 
common, context-free deep structure, and the observation that it is the context-bound 
aspects which seem to be most determinant. 
Further empirical findings contradicting the cognitivist premises sketched above 
emerged as a series of ethnographic studies moved research out of the laboratory and 
into informal everyday settings. These studies investigated the extent to which 
conceptual (e.g., mathematical) problem-solving skills were similarly displayed 
across formal and informal contexts (e.g., Lave, Murtaugh, & Rocha, 1984; Lave, 
1988; Nunes, Schliemann, & Carraher, 1993; Suchman, 1987). Particularly influential 
was the seminal work of Lave (1988), who compared arithmetic practices in formal 
school situations and during everyday situations such as grocery shopping in the 
supermarket. In her studies, she found important discontinuities between the ways that 
the same participants performed arithmetic calculations in the formal and the informal 
situations. Lave described how arithmetic problem-solving practices that may have 
been seen as isomorphic from an expert’s perspective (a) were structured differently 
by the participants (b) as a function of the actual material and cultural contingencies 
of the emerging situations.  
Theoretical challenges to the classical view 
In addition to the empirical findings described above, several theoretical problems 
have been articulated in the literature during the most recent decades. Upon 
examination of the literature, three related implications that derive from the 
representationalist stance of the relation between learners and their context can be 
identified. First, an approach that holds an unproblematic relation between structure in 
the environment and an individual’s representation thereof requires an a priori, 
unequivocal definition of what the relevant, inherent properties or structures in the 
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environment are that can be represented, thus neglecting or at least not accounting for 
the myriad possible ways in which learners may structure a situation differently than 
researchers, teachers, or experts in a given domain do (e.g., Lave, 1988; Lobato, 
2003). An implication of this assumption in research on education is that, by using 
this approach, we begin by adopting a particular stance of how the world ought to 
look like for the students. Thus, from this approach we can inquire whether or not 
learners achieve a favored, canonical understanding of a problem situation that we 
have previously selected, but we cannot account for other alternative understandings 
that the learners may have achieved of the situation.  
Second, by holding that representations are symbolic descriptions of the structures in 
the environment—i.e., that representations denote or describe objects, properties, and 
their relations (e.g., Gentner & Markman, 1997)—information-processing approaches 
divorce perception from the motives and material contingencies that characterize 
situated action, while on the other hand they conflate the processes of perceiving that 
particular structure (e.g., seeing a graph) and the process of conceptualizing it (e.g., 
reasoning about the graph as having a particular currency in a particular scientific 
practice) (Clancy, 1997; Wagner, 2010). From this view, knowing is always 
“inherently conceptually knowing about some thing” (Clancey, 1997, p. 279, original 
emphasis). This assumption, however, makes it difficult to account for the empirical 
evidence presented above, which suggests that relating a new problem situation to 
prior experience entails dealing with the particular contingencies. It also makes it 
difficult to account for the emergence of new knowledge structures during learning 
situations. For, if symbolic processing and deep structure govern the organization of 
thinking at both the perceptual and the conceptual level, how do the knowledge 
structures necessary for processing emerge in the first place? This question, the so-
called learning paradox (e.g., Bereiter, 1986), is recognized as one of the major 
troubles of the classical cognitivist approach (Roth, 2011; Sfard, 2008). 
Addressing the challenges to the classical view 
The empirical and theoretical evidence described above challenge the idea that 
transfer is dependent on context-free structures. To address these challenges, several 
researchers from the information-processing perspective have adapted their models 
and methods without modifying the basic premises of knowing as the encoding and 
representing of information in abstract knowledge representations (e.g., Chi & 
VanLehn, 2012; Gentner, Loewinstein, & Thompson, 2003; Kolodner, 1997; Nokes, 
2009). However, by maintaining the assumption of an unproblematic relation between 
the objective structures in the environment and the symbolic representations that an 
individual holds of them, these approaches do not solve the more fundamental 
problem of how it is possible to perceive structure in the first place when we do not 
yet have the necessary representations to perceive it. 
 During the last decades, several researchers have advanced not just reorganizations of 
the classical notion of transfer, but deeper re-conceptualizations of the whole concept. 
These include sociocultural conceptualizations of transfer as consequential transitions 
across social activities (Beach, 1999); activity-theory-oriented conceptualizations of 
transfer as developmental transfer between activity systems (Tuomi-Gröhn & 
Engeström, 2003; Konkola et al., 2007); situative approaches emphasizing the 
perception of affordances in the environment (Greeno, Moore, & Smith, 1993; Engle, 
2006; Lobato et al., 2012); phenomenological analyses of transfer as the awakening of 
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bodily episodic feelings (Nemirovsky, 2011); and constructivist approaches replacing 
the notion of abstract representations by that of context-sensitive concept projections 
(diSessa & Wagner, 2005; Wagner, 2010). Common to all of them is an expansion of 
their conceptualizations of learning beyond the individual mental abstract 
representation to better account for the intrinsic relation between subjects and their 
immediate material and social environments. In the following section, I discuss these 
alternative frameworks in more detail. 
Alternative theoretical technologies 
In this section, I provide a detailed account of two particular studies to characterize 
two of the most influential approaches that have been developed to address the 
challenges described above—the constructivist and sociocultural/situative (ecological) 
approaches. The studies are selected for several reasons. First, each study can be seen 
as representative of one of the two major strands. Of course, considerable variability 
exists within each approach, a variability that is not possible to cover within the scope 
of this dissertation. For that reason, throughout the analyses I elaborate on how the 
features found in the two particular studies coincide with or differ from extant 
research from similar approaches. Second, the two studies specifically address the 
problems with the classical paradigm described above and pursue accounting for how 
learners come to establish relations of similarity across situations through context-
bound activities. Third, the two studies are recent and published in one of the most 
influential journals in the cognitive and the learning sciences, thus constituting up-to-
date and relevant contributions to the fields of interest to this thesis. Both studies 
provide important contributions toward a characterization of the role of context in 
establishing conceptual connections across objects and situations during educational 
activities. Finally, the two studies take a methodological approach that can be coined 
as event-centered (Reimann, 2009), as opposed to a variable-based or systemic 
approach (Arnseth & Ludvigsen, 2006). Accordingly, the studies’ interest is in 
studying learning events as these unfold in real time. Throughout my account, I pay 
particular attention to the video-based analyses of interaction. As discussed below, the 
two studies conduct different kinds of analysis. This makes it possible to elaborate a 
critical assessment of how theoretical technologies typical in constructivist and 
ecological approaches result in particular kinds of empirical objects, and therefore in 
particular accounts of how conceptual structures and objects of learning emerge and 
are connected through activity. 
Constructivist approaches I 
Constructivism has possibly been the most influential approach in educational 
research since Jean Piaget’s writings became widely influential during the sixties and 
seventies (e.g., Piaget, 1974, 1977). Piaget’s conceptualizations of children’s 
cognitive development as involving the formation of logical interpretive structures 
provided the ground for the emergence of a long tradition of conceptual change 
studies. Conceptual change studies investigate the conceptions that students generate 
during activity in their attempts to make sense of the surrounding world (e.g., Carey, 
1985; diSessa, 2006; Posner et al., 1982; Treagust & Duit, 2008; Vousniadou, 2008). 
Despite retaining a focus on internal mental processes as a mediating mechanism 
between ontologically distinct learning subjects and objective environments, Piagetian 
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and neo-Piagetian frameworks differ from information-processing approaches in that 
they do not assume an unproblematic relation between the world and its 
representation in the mind. Instead, individuals construct the representation. Piaget 
explained this process of construction as consisting in cognitive processes of 
empirical and reflective abstraction (Piaget, 1977). Through the former, individuals 
develop an understanding of the properties of the things in the world as a result of 
registering sensorimotor patterns that arise during active interaction with the world. 
Through the latter, patterns of one’s mental activities are registered. These patterns 
result in schemata, which further develop through the processes of assimilation and 
accommodation. 
Notwithstanding the wide adoption of the constructivist framework, few explicit 
attempts have been made to address the problem of transfer from this perspective. An 
exception is the work of Wagner and diSessa, who have developed the transfer-in-
pieces framework (diSessa & Wagner, 2005; Wagner, 2006). Building on this 
framework, Wagner (2010) has recently advanced a detailed account of how people 
structure different situations as belonging to a same class of conceptual—in this case, 
mathematical—activity. Wagner’s study attempts to challenge the classical premise 
that “transfer requires the identification of common structure across situations” (p. 
451) by showing “how what experts consider a single mathematical concept or 
principle may come to be recognized through a variety of assimilatory cognitive 
resources whose usefulness is influenced by contextual factors” (p. 443). It is in 
addressing the relation between “contextual affordances” (p. 444) and the 
development of coherent conceptualizations that Wagner’s study is particularly 
relevant to this thesis. 
Constructivist approaches II: Wagner’s transfer-in-pieces 
Central to Wagner’s approach is the notion of concept projection, which in several 
ways differs from the classical notion of mental representation as well as from other 
characterizations from the conceptual change literature that consider individuals’ 
mental conceptions as consisting of coherent, relatively systematic frameworks (e.g., 
Vosniadou & Skopeliti, 2013). A concept projection is “a set of knowledge elements 
with which a knower assimilates and interprets … the situation’s affordances in a 
particular, meaningful way” (Wagner, 2010, p. 450). Importantly, those knowledge 
elements are not abstract but “context-sensitive” (p. 450). Thus, “any single concept 
may require the use of different knowledge elements by the knower in order to attend 
to … and sensibly coordinate information relevant to that concept in a particular 
context” (p. 450).  
Drawing on this framework, Wagner presents a detailed case study of a single 
undergraduate student who solves and reflects upon a number of problems involving a 
common mathematical principle (the law of large numbers) during a teaching 
interview (Hershkowitz, Schwarz, & Dreyfus, 2001). The case study is complemented 
with excerpts from interviews with five other students. During the interviews, Wagner 
presented the students with a variety of problems, activities, and computer simulations 
related to the mathematical “law of large numbers,” which the students had been 
learning about during their regular classroom time. To analyze the ways in which the 
students structured and related the different problem situations, Wagner conducts 
microgenetic analyses of the moment-by-moment actions and utterances. Wagner 
(2010) describes his analytical approach as knowledge analysis, which aims at 
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“describing students’ responses with respect to knowledge used as suggested 
especially by accompanying language and reasoning strategies” (p. 455). Wagner’s 
method, thus, falls within a larger family of analytical practices that are common in 
conceptual change studies, where interactional data is used to make inferences 
regarding the knowledge held by the participants. In these practices, verbalizations 
and actions are interpreted as the expressions of an underlying conception that, 
although hidden from direct examination, somehow dominates the participants’ 
speech and gestures. 
To better understand how Wagner makes use of this method, I examine some of the 
concrete analyses that the author presents in his study to account for how a student, 
Jason, comes to structure and draw conceptual connections across different problems 
that relate to a common mathematical principle, the “law of large numbers.” I present 
the analyses in three sections that highlight practices that can be found in other 
constructivist-oriented analyses of social interaction: reifying talk and gestures as 
expressions of underlying hidden knowledge, treating the knowledge domain as the 
context of interaction, and reifying courses of ordered action as courses of mental 
synthesis. In discussing these aspects, my aim is to address general questions about 
data analysis rather than Wagner’s specific case. 
• Reifying talk and gestures as expressions of underlying hidden knowledge 
The first practice I wish to discuss is that of treating the participants’ talk and gestures 
as expressions of underlying knowledge that needs to be inferred by means of the 
analyses. To illustrate this practice, I recur to the excerpt below, which takes place as 
Jason attempts to solve a problem. In the problem, a skier who knows that she can run 
a particular course in under 2 minutes and 15 seconds should choose between running 
that course only once, or running it three times to compute the average, in order to 
qualify for a competition. Jason has to decide which option is best. To facilitate 
reading, I present the excerpts numbered (they are not numbered in the original), and 
shorten some of the length elaborations that do not feature in the analyses by using 
ellipses (…).  
1 J: So I think it’s better for her to shoot for just doing it once, give all of her gusto once. Because, let’s 
say, even if we had the three times, the other choice, she would do one really bad [gestures to his left], 
one really good [gestures to his right], and so the other one was a true representation of her 40% 
[moves hands together to meet in front of him] (…) So I would say run the course once and drink a lot 
of Gatorade and feel real good. 
2 W: What did you mean there when you said, “take the one left and represent that with 40”? I’m not 
sure what that meant.  
3 J: For some-, it’s not, it doesn’t, I don’t see the math in it. But it seems for some reason on, on 
averages, or, well, I guess it’s the average compared to the median, almost. Do you have that balance? 
So she has an extreme over here [gestures to his left], a real bad day, a real good day [gestures to his 
right], or vice versa, two of them are gone, we can exclude those, because that almost seems like 
chance. A good one and a bad one. Then only left with what she typically is [joins hands together]. I 
don’t know if there’s math that could-, which is 40. (…) 
4 W: So do you have any math associated with that or not? 
5 J: It seems like the average is what a-. Well, just loose. Nothing, no numbers, actually bop in my 
mind and [garbled]. 
6 W: OK, so, so I’ll ask it this way. Have, have you used that concept somewhere else? 
7 J: I think so. Or at least on that, the concept of, of averages being weighted here, weighted here. And 
that, you know, if you get something here you have to balance here if you want to-. I think. 
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Wagner (W) begins his analysis by drawing the inference that “Jason interpreted this 
problem through his understanding of how averages work” (p. 457). To ground such a 
claim, the author refers to Jason’s uses of the term “average value” and his “repeated 
use of hand gestures varying between extremely high or low values and a central … 
value” (p. 457), which the author interprets as a “visual presentation” of Jason’s 
reasoning. In this, the student’s speech and gestures are taken as an expression of an 
underlying “understanding” of “how averages work.” Words and gestures are 
presenting something—an underlying understanding—that they themselves are not, 
but which nonetheless can be inferred from them. Importantly, participants do not 
seem to have to be aware of it for the analyst to identify such an understanding. Thus, 
that a concept of the “average weights” grounds the student’s talk is not something 
that the student explicitly articulates. Indeed, it is not until the interviewer offers the 
idea of “a concept” in turns 4 and 6 that the student begins to talk of the concept of 
“average weights” as a possible way to characterize his ongoing reasoning. 
Paradoxically, however, what could be seen as a product of the unfolding 
conversation is presented as the explanatory structure underlying it. 
• Treating the knowledge domain as the context of interaction 
An important goal in Wagner’s analyses, and a general goal in any model aiming to 
overcome the limitations of the classical approach discussed above, is to account for 
how contextual aspects are related to the emergence of coherence and continuity 
during activity. Despite the careful attention to interactional detail, however, in 
different parts of Wagner’s analyses context seems to be conceptualized as consisting 
of the explicit problem formulations or the implicit mathematical knowledge domain 
rather than the actual interview situations being analyzed. Thus, in the excerpt above, 
there seems to be work conducted by the researcher (W) in conducting the interview, 
producing questions that seem responsive to the ways the student answers. In 
Wagner’s analyses, however, these questions (turns 4 and 6) seem to be treated as 
means to pull out from the student what he already understands or knows rather than 
being directly involved in the formation of Jason’s thinking. Rather than focusing on 
the material aspects of the ongoing interaction, there is a focus on whether and how 
the problems are being discussed in mathematical terms. This aspect can be further 
illustrated in the excerpts below, where Jason is discussing another problem, one in 
which he is asked whether Christina, who does not play squash as well as her friend 
Angela does, should go for a 9-point or a 15-point match if she wishes to have more 
chances to win. The excerpts are interesting because, as Wagner elaborates, Jason 
comes to associate his reasoning about percentages and averages with a previous task 
involving “flipping the coin.” That is, Jason comes to draw conceptual connections 
across the different problems. 
1 J: … OK. So we assume Christina stinks. She’s below average, saying average is 50%. She’s below 
average [gestures to his left]. Uh, the other chick’s above average, above 50% [gestures to his right]. 
The above 50%, it’s gonna be easy to keep on going high, and it would be easier for the lower one, the 
one who plays bad to go low, because she only has to do better on a few times. It’s, it’s almost like 
those ones we were talking about. (…) 
2 W: [garbled] Talk about how it’s like those other ones. // I mean, I [garbled]. // 
3 J: // Like, uh, flipping // flipping the coin. Uh, if you wanted exactly something or between 
something, sometimes you might want to go ten times, sometimes you might want to go ten thousand. 
Um, it’s where I think this is the same sort of thing, to where she’s below average, so she wants to go 
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less, to where the other person is better than average would want to go more. I think that, the average 
comes into play there, um, for each of them (…) 
… 
4 J: This, the same thing, in a sense of…she’s choosing the options of once or three times. Large, 
small. A, B. Um, large small; large, small; A and B again. [Flipping between the Skier and the Hospital 
Problems as he talks] 
5 W: They’re similar in the choice she has to make. Are they similar in the, in the principles you used 
to answer them? 
6 J: Exactly. They’re exact in the sense of, from two ways, maybe, the person to do something who has 
a bad-. This is less math, but just-. The person who USUALLY does not do it well, is better to do it less 
times, than more … 
Wagner’s main claim with regard to the episode is that “Jason made an association 
between an intuitive argument against a poor performer consistently performing well 
over a long period of time and his understanding of the law of large numbers” (p. 
461). Although the law of large numbers is not mentioned in the excerpt, Wagner 
finds evidence that “Jason associated his reasoning with his experience of the law of 
large numbers through the coin-flipping simulations”—a task that the student had 
solved previously. Although Jason had not structured the previous problems as having 
to do with the law of large numbers, in the current excerpt he mentions that the 
problem is “almost like those” about flipping the coin” (turns 1 and 3). This, Wagner 
convincingly argues, shows that Jason comes to structure differently a number of 
problems (some of them in terms of “average,” others in terms of “the law of large 
numbers”), yet recognizes them as addressing the same underlying mathematical 
principle. 
However, and despite acknowledging the “context-dependent and rather intuitive” 
ways in which Jason discusses the connection, Wagner seems to pay little attention to 
the interview situation as part of the developmental process that he is describing. 
Rather, the author focuses on the problems’ statements, which, according to him, in 
previous occasions had not given the affordances to draw the connection that the 
student has now achieved. Thus, Wagner suggests, “the peculiar nature of the sample 
sizes in the problem served as a distraction for Jason” because “nothing in the 
statement or context of the problem gave the idea of statistical sampling or the law of 
large numbers high cuing priority, and the question of whether to average or not to 
average—reflecting the actual problem statement itself—became the point of 
concern” (p. 458). 
• Reifying courses of ordered action as courses of mental synthesis 
Throughout the analyses, Wagner aims to demonstrate how Jason came to 
accommodate his understanding of the “law of large numbers” to the different 
contextual situations that the different problems posed. In doing so, Wagner provides 
detailed accounts of the interactional materials that he is analyzing. It would indeed 
seem that those interactional materials are fundamental to the phenomenon being 
described. Thus, with regard to the excerpts presented above, Wagner argues, “it is 
here, in the accompanying adjustments to Jason’s knowledge structures that took 
place as he associated previously distinct ideas, that I locate his process of 
accommodating different contextual conditions” (p. 461, emphasis added). 
Accommodation, then, seems to be described as a local, publicly available process that 
takes place in and as the actions that the participants perform during interaction. 
However, as the analysis continues, we do not find an articulation of how these 
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interactional materials are involved in the process. In explaining how Jason had come 
to develop his new understanding, gestures and utterances acquire a self-actional 
character (Dewey & Bentley, 1949); that is, they are described as having independent 
cognitive powers. As Wagner notes, “Jason’s … language and interpretive ideas were 
assimilatory knowledge elements with which he composed a concept projection for 
the law of large numbers that served him well in structuring particular contextual 
circumstances” (p. 464). Jason’s words are thus conceived as “assimilatory 
knowledge elements” in their own right, without reference to their actual contexts of 
occurrence, that is, independent of the interview as the social and material context 
under analysis.  
There is in this treatment an inversion in which the cognitive processes of assimilation 
and accommodation, which are inferred from the conversation, come to be posited as 
existing in advance of the conversation itself. Thus, in describing what arguably is a 
course of situated action during which new ways of structuring and connecting 
problems indeed emerge, the circumstances of such emergence—the words and 
actions that are materially produced in the course of activity—are submitted to a 
formal process that is then given ultimate causality to explain the sequence(s). There 
is no account of interaction as a process of change; rather, interaction is explained by 
the mental changes that are assumed to underlie the episode. This practice, which can 
be found throughout much literature on conceptual change, stems from the (more or 
less) tacit premise that conceptual thinking underlies all situated action. Yet, empirical 
research from an ecological perspective has shown that the conceptions and 
misconceptions that researchers identify in interviews are as much results of the 
ongoing material interactions taking place during conversation as they are part of the 
participants’ knowledge and thinking (Schoultz, Wyndhamn, & Säljö, 2001; Roth, 
Lee, & Hwang, 2008). 
Summary 
Wagner’s constructivist transfer-in-pieces approach represents an important re-
conceptualization that overcomes many of the problems of classic paradigm. The 
framework provides a neat distinction between the processes by means of which a 
situation comes to be structurally perceived on the one hand, and by means of which it 
is subsequently associated with a particular class of situations on the other. It offers a 
transfer mechanism that builds upon the interdependence between knowledge 
elements and situational contingencies rather than on abstract, context-free 
representations. Yet, despite acknowledging the context-bound nature of learning in 
its premises, upon examination of the analytical practices it is possible to observe how 
some of the limitations associated with the classical paradigm are retained. Whereas 
the analyses provide convincing evidence that the students were developing different 
ways of structuring diverse problems, yet conceptually connecting them to the same 
underlying mathematical principle, they do not provide an account of how these 
achievements were related to the immediate contextual aspects of the interview 
situations that were being analyzed. 
Sociocultural and situative approaches I 
Since ethnographic studies such as those by Lave began to evidence the inherent 
discontinuities that characterize arithmetic practices across formal and informal 
settings, a growing number of researchers have been concerned with developing new 
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conceptualizations of continuity and coherence, building upon the premise that 
knowing is an accomplishment of situated social practice. Unlike constructivist 
approaches, which set the analytical focus on an individual’s mental constructions, 
sociocultural and situative approaches aim to investigate how structures and structural 
connections emerge in and as the result of coordinated social activities that take place 
as people participate in and across different social practices. Notions such as 
trajectories of participation have been developed to account for this aspect of growth 
as indivisible from the social contexts within which it develops (Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Ludvigsen et al., 2011). 
A way in which studies within these frameworks get away from the premise of a 
dualistic division between subjects and objects is by appealing to the notion of 
affordances, as developed in Gibson’s ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979). 
According to Gibson, “the perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a 
value-free physical object to which meaning is somehow added” (p. 140, emphasis 
added). Rather, the notion aims to capture the inseparability of our perceptual 
processes and our sensory-motor coordinations with the environment during situated 
activity: “the possibilities of the environment and the way of life of the [organism] go 
together inseparably” (p. 141). Greeno, Smith, and Moore (1993) build on this notion 
to offer a situative alternative account in which seeing coherence and continuity 
across different situations does not consist of bringing the same knowledge structure, 
but occurs as the structure of affordances of an activity is perceived as invariant 
across changing situations. 
Another important premise in ecological approaches is the culturally mediated nature 
of learning and cognition (Vygotsky, 1978). Accordingly, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, cultural tools, and most importantly language, shape the ways we come to 
think and relate to the world around us. In this regard, researchers have investigated 
discursive practices such as recaps that teachers elaborate to summarize and 
conceptually connect classroom activities (Edwards & Mercer, 1987; Mercer, 1995), 
and they have discussed pedagogical link-making as a fundamental practice that 
teachers perform to draw conceptual connections across ideas (Scott, Mortimer, & 
Ametller, 2011). Engle (2006) discussed the notion of framing interactions to 
describe the ways in which a teacher performed particular discursive moves to frame 
the different problem-solving activities in which a group of students engaged as 
conceptually related to each other, and to frame the students’ participation in ways 
that promoted intercontextuality. Combining content analysis and interaction analysis 
methods, Engle concluded that “transfer is more likely to occur—all other things 
being equal—to the extent that learning contexts are framed as part of larger ongoing 
activities in which students are integral participants.”  
In this section, my aim is to examine how the premises and analytical practices that 
are common across these studies play out in the concrete analytical work of one 
particular study. I have chosen Lobato et al.’s study because it nicely combines 
aspects from both situative and sociocultural approaches. With regard to the former, 
the study emphases perceptual processes that emerge during social activity. With 
regard to the latter, the study also pays attention to the role of the cultural artifacts in 
organizing activity. The study builds upon the actor-oriented transfer perspective, 
which Lobato has developed to approach continuity from the point of view of the 
learners rather than from pre-given, expert-based definitions of what kind of 
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knowledge is interesting to investigate (Lobato, 2003, 2012). The goal of Lobato et 
al.’s (2012) study is to expand that perspective by elaborating on the notion of 
noticing as a plausible “transfer process” (p. 433). In the context of their study 
(mathematics education), noticing refers to “selecting, interpreting, and working with 
particular mathematical features or regularities when multiple sources of information 
compete for students’ attention” (p. 438).  
Sociocultural and situative approaches II: Lobato et al.’s “noticing framework” 
An important premise in Lobato et al.’s study is that there is interdependence between 
what learners come to notice during a classroom situation and how such noticing 
relates to the social organization of the classroom activity. To investigate this 
interdependence, the authors present the focusing framework. The framework 
identifies a set of situational aspects or elements, including (a) task features, (b) 
centers of focus, which describe the features that teachers and students pay attention 
to, (c) focusing interactions or “discursive practices” (p. 440) by means of which 
particular centers of focus emerge, and (d) the nature of the mathematical activity, 
which aims at capturing the “classrooms’ culture of doing mathematics” (p. 441). 
These elements then become different levels of analysis by means of which the 
authors investigate how “the nature of reasoning on transfer tasks across students 
from two classes are related to the centers of focus that emerged in each class” (p. 
442). In the following, I describe how the framework is applied in concrete analyses, 
paying special attention to how social interaction data is mobilized to draw inferences 
about conceptual coherence and continuity phenomena.  
• Identifying discursive practices 
The first step in Lobato et al.’s analyses consists in identifying different reasoning 
trends among four classrooms of 8th- and 9th-grade students studying the same 
mathematical topic, namely “slope and linear functions.” To that end, the authors 
analyze individual interviews, the classroom materials produced by the students, and 
video recordings from the actual classroom interactions. In analyzing these materials, 
the authors identify two different patterns of reasoning about linear function graphs. 
In one classroom, the students consistently appeared to treat the points and axes in the 
graph as representing quantities, that is, “conceptions of attributes of objects, events, 
or situations as being measurable” (p. 452). By contrast, in the other classroom the 
students consistently treated the same aspects as physical objects, which limited the 
students’ ability to correctly find and interpret the slope in context. Unlike classical 
transfer studies that would disregard these practices as a failure-to-transfer, within the 
actor-oriented framework these are studied as events of coherence achievement. 
As other studies from an ecological perspective do, Lobato et al. set their study to 
identify discursive practices associated with the two identified reasoning trends. To 
that end, the researchers turn to the analyses of the video recordings of the actual 
classroom situations. A first important discursive practice identified is renaming, 
which the researchers first derive from prior research by Goodwin (1994) and further 
identify in their own data. Goodwin describes “coding schemes” (which Lobato et al. 
rename as “renaming practices”) as “one systematic practice used to transform the 
world into the categories and events that are relevant to the work of the profession” 
(p. 608). The second discursive practice is that of quantitative dialogue, which 
emerges from the analyses of the first class’s interactions—the class that came to 
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develop reasoning about graphs in terms of quantities. The authors define it as “verbal 
communication that focuses attention on quantities as measurable attributes of 
objects” (Lobato et al., 2012, p. 463). A third discursive practice is object dialogue, 
namely “verbal communication that emphasizes physical objects or events without 
additionally focusing on relationships among measurable attributes of these objects” 
(p. 466). Most of the remaining analyses in Lobato et al.’s study consists in 
demonstrating that—but, as we shall see, not so much how—these discursive 
practices are related to the emergence of distinctive forms of reasoning about graphs 
in each of the classrooms. 
• Reifying situated interaction as discursive practice 
Particularly important for the purpose of this chapter is to examine the ways in which 
interaction data is mobilized to provide accounts of how coherence and continuity are 
achieved as social, context-bound achievements. To do so, I focus on how the 
discursive practice of renaming is investigated in what the authors call “focusing 
interactions.” As part of their analyses, the authors present the following excerpt from 
the classroom that came to develop reasoning about graphs in terms of quantities. The 
episode takes place after the teacher asks the students to graph a known same-speed 
value of 30 centimeters in 12 seconds. The interaction takes place as there is a graph 
inscribed in the whiteboard with time in seconds in the x-axis and distance in 
centimeters in the y-axis. Before, the teacher has emphasized that it is “points” that 
must be inscribed in the graph to mark values, and that these “points” are labeled by a 
number pair, which in the example above would be “(12, 30).” The excerpt is 
presented as part of the evidence that “same-speed value was renamed as a point” and 
that this renaming “was accomplished in a manner that supported students’ continued 
quantitative reasoning” (p. 463). In the excerpt, the students are working to address 
the questions “Can you think of any other points that you can put on the graph?” and 
“How many points do you think there will be?” (S: student; T: Teacher). 
1 S: How many points do you think there will be like to count these? 
2 T: Well do you think that’s it, or do you think that you can put more up there? 
3 S: You can put any single point right here [gestured to the graph]. 
4 T: Well if you put a point out here [gestured to a region not populated with points], do you think that 
it will be the same-speed value? 
5 S: No. 
6 T: Okay do you think there are any others that are same-speed values? 
7 S: It could be 20 and 8. 
8 T: Then you need to keep going. You’ve got a few more in there. 
Despite the relative detail of the excerpt, which describes talk and gestures, as the sole 
analysis the authors state the following: “In this exchange, the meaning of point was 
negotiated and associated with ‘same-speed’ value” (p. 464). From reading the 
premises that frame the presentation of the excerpt, the reader gets the sense that the 
excerpt is meant to exhibit the “negotiation of meaning” of the word “point,” and that 
the word comes to be used to name a particular feature of the graph, namely the same-
speed values. However, no articulation is given of just how the excerpt is evidence of 
what it is claimed to be evidence of (a negotiation of meaning and an association of 
terms/features). Rather, the excerpt is presented as self-explaining, assuming that 
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whatever is there to be seen is immediately available to the reader. And whereas this 
may be so for knowledgeable readers, precisely which features of the excerpt make it 
readily accessible, and by means of which competences such features come to be 
identified, is not addressed. 
This way of presenting interactional data to exemplify a discursive practice is not 
limited to one excerpt. The analysis follows by presenting more instances in which 
renaming is claimed to occur, such as when a collection of same-speed values (i.e., 
points) was labeled a line, as described in the following account:  
…one of the students, Ana, exclaimed, ‘Oh I get it! So basically you can just fill the whole part . . . you 
can just go like this,’ and she drew a line on the graph through a collection of points. The teacher 
immediately followed up this student’s discovery by renaming the collection of same-speed values as a 
line: ‘Yes, you can fill the whole entire thing . . . but would you go like this [marked dots randomly on 
the graph] or would they be on the line?’ to which many students responded, ‘The line.’” (p. 457). 
In analyzing this sequence, the authors note that “renaming functioned as part of a 
discursive practice in which students contributed ideas and the teacher responded by 
rephrasing, renaming, and elaborating their ideas as part of the students’ progressive 
mathematical development” (p. 465). Again, although specific actions such as 
“rephrasing,” “renaming,” and “elaborating” are mentioned, little to no reference is 
made to how those aspects come to exist as actual, material aspects of the situations 
transcribed. Thus, whereas evidence is provided that renaming practices lead to 
“solidified” ways of accounting for particular features of graphs as quantities 
(classroom 1) or as objects (classroom 2) throughout the history of classroom 
interactions, and that those ways of accounting can be found in the students’ 
subsequent reasoning during the interviews, the question How does the discursive 
practice of renaming relate to the situated practices that are transcribed in the 
excerpts? remains unanswered. 
• Coherence and continuity as unproblematic aspects of discourse  
An implication of reducing interaction data in terms of larger discursive practices 
without specification of how the materials provide for the identification of those 
practices is that the emergence of coherence and continuity is presented as a seamless 
flow in which linguistic and bodily aspects are unproblematic for the participants. It is 
as if once the discursive practice has been defined, there is no need to elaborate on 
how the practice is brought about by the participants as an actual course of action. 
Most lacking is an elaboration of just how and why there is a “negotiation of 
meaning” going on in situ when a new category (e.g., a point) is introduced as a way 
of structuring perceptual fields in the classroom. The question is particularly 
important if one considers that learning/teaching situations must involve some sort of 
struggle, a passage along which learners come to populate a perceptual field of action 
that was not accessible to them before. Other studies from an ecological perspective 
have addressed the conflicting aspects of adopting new categories introduced as part 
of the [science] curriculum (e.g., Arnseth & Säljö, 2007; Ludvigsen, 2012), though 
these have not elaborated on issues of coherence and continuity. In general, however, 
and as Mehan (1998) notes in a review of the literature, sociocultural studies of 
classroom interaction often exhibit “snippets of inquiry, higher order thinking, and 
sense making, but not the incredible amount of back-stage preparation, the in situ 
disciplining, behavior management, and improvisation that is necessary to carry off 
any teaching-learning interaction” (p. 264). Rather than the “in situ disciplining” that 
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must be involved in any teaching situation, and which the very category of 
“renaming” seems to assume, the analyses offered by Lobato et al. appear to treat the 
transcripts “as docile fields for writing formal analysis” (Macbeth, 2003, p. 255), 
where the renaming practices appear as uncontested and unproblematic affairs for 
those involved in constituting the practice itself as an actual event.  
Summary 
Lobato et al.’s study provides important insights to any theoretical attempt to account 
for the emergence of coherence and continuity as a function of the social organization 
of classroom activities. Through a multiple-level analysis, the authors identify specific 
patterned practices that are associated with specific patterned forms of reasoning. 
These findings resonate well with other research building on the Vygotskyan premise 
that individual psychological functions exist first as social functions of 
communication, then are later internalized by individuals, and therefore the findings 
contribute to mounting evidence that particular forms of discourse can be related to 
particular ways of reasoning (e.g., Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Scott, Mortimer, & 
Aguiar, 2006; for a review, see Mercer, 2008). Notions such as renaming and 
focusing interactions grant attention to the connection between discourse and the 
immediate social and material environment, and thus they constitute an important 
reconceptualization of the relation between subjects and objects with respect to the 
classical approach. However, in the discussion above I have also identified limitations 
associated with particular analytical practices that come to treat the classroom 
materials of interaction as instances of the identified discursive practices that bring 
about coherence and continuity without elaborating on how those practices become a 
matter of interest to the participants in their moment-by-moment talk-in-interaction. 
Units of analysis and the problem of emergence 
Throughout this chapter, I have discussed different approaches to conceptual 
coherence and continuity. I began by describing the classical view of transfer as the 
carrying over of abstract knowledge structures, and then I discussed the empirical and 
theoretical challenges that this view has motivated. To better understand how these 
challenges have been taken up in the recent literature, I provided detailed accounts of 
two studies representing two alternate frameworks—constructivist and ecological. 
Though starting from different premises, both studies share an interest in describing 
conceptual coherence and continuity as a function of situational contingencies. Upon 
examination of their respective analytical practices, both achievements and limitations 
with regard to that aim were described. In Wagner’s study, detailed descriptions of the 
actual courses of interaction were subsequently explained as being the result of 
individually constructed concept projections. In Lobato et al.’s study, that the 
achievement of conceptual coherence was inherently a social process was a premise. 
Yet, by identifying extended stretches of talk-in-interaction as instances of particular 
discursive practices, that study left unexplained the detailed organizational work that 
was performed by the teachers and students to constitute such discursive practices. In 
both studies, the courses of situated action that were the object of study were reduced 
to analytical categories—mental constructions in Wagner’s case, discursive practices 
in Lobato et al’s—that, though displaying radically different premises, had one thing 
in common: the exclusion of the unfolding of time as part of the minimal unit of 
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analysis. This is captured in schematic form in the (abstract) unit of analysis depicted 
in Figures 2a and 2b.  
 
Figure 2: Inter-actional unit of analysis. 
In the case of a constructivist framework as exhibited by Wagner, a concept 
projection is related to a given social and material situation (Figure 2a). Through 
assimilation and accommodation processes during interaction, the concept projection 
is expanded or transformed so as to cover a wider set of situations. Interaction, 
however, remains outside of the unit of analysis. In the case of an ecological 
framework, as exhibited by Lobato et al.’s study, the minimal unit involves a change 
in discursive practices, which irreducibly connect subjects and objects (Figure 2b). In 
the case described above, whereas before the classroom was focusing on “objects,” 
there is now a focus on “quantities.” Yet, the actual work that comes to constitute 
those practices, and therefore, the internal mechanisms by means of which 
participants come to change participation, are left out of the unit of analysis. Missing 
in both analytical units is the temporal transition, the process of development that 
takes place between one state of knowledge (or practice) and the following state in 
which a new way of accounting for objects has been established. Between states, the 
temporal gap is surmounted by an analytical category that accounts for the 
transformative situated engagements, which constitute the empirical materials that 
give access to the analyses.  
Precisely these transformative engagements are the main focus in the foundational 
frameworks that were laid down by scholars such as Dewey and Vygotsky, from 
whom definitively the ecological models, and, according to several accounts, the 
constructivist frameworks as well (e.g., Phillips, 1995; Savery & Duffy, 1996), draw 
to elaborate their respective analytical approaches. Common to these scholars was an 
effort to develop units of analysis capable of accounting for coherence, continuity, 
and development as irreducible (i.e., not to be divided by a temporal gap) empirical 
objects of research in their own terms. In the remainder of this thesis, my aim is to 
elaborate on how the pragmatist and cultural-historical frameworks developed by 
Dewey and Vygotsky respectively offer a foundation on which to develop theoretical 
technologies to account for how talk and other bodily aspects of social interaction 
come to be aspects internal to the constitution of coherence and continuity. 
Concept
Projection
Concept
Projection
Situation A Situations (A + n)
Assimilation/
Accommodation
Figure 2a: Wagner’s unit of analysis
Individual
Situation
Discursive 
practice
Individual
Situation
Discursive 
practiceDiscursive
practice
Figure 2b: Lobato et al.’s unit of analysis
Chapter 3 – Analytical 
Framework  
In the previous chapter, I discuss the important contributions that recent constructivist 
and ecological approaches have made towards an understanding of the relation 
between the emergence of conceptual coherence and the contexts of activity within 
which it emerges. In the same chapter, I also point out that the units of analysis 
developed as part of these two research programs have left unaddressed the question 
of how the concrete aspects of moment-by-moment social interaction come to be 
constitutive moments of the phenomenon under research. This is so because of an 
analytical reduction of stretches of talk-in-interaction into categories—mental or 
discursive—that do not retain the emergent, temporal, and transformative aspects of 
situated action. Thus, even when the irreducible relation between subjects and social 
contexts is a premise, by describing actual courses of interaction in terms of 
“discursive practices” without specifying how the concrete interactional materials 
provide resources for the identification of such practices in the first place, the premise 
comes to be delivered as a sort of “black box.” Here, I use the term black box in the 
specific sense given by anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972), who characterized it 
as “a conventional agreement between scientists to stop trying to explain things at a 
certain point” (p. 49). As an illustration, Bateson used the example of engineers who 
“instead of drawing all the details [of a complicated machine], … put a box to stand 
for a whole bunch of parts and label the box with what that bunch of parts is 
supposed to do” (p. 49–50). Just as in Bateson’s example, the goal of the present 
study is to contribute to an understanding of how the “bunch of parts” that constitute 
particular discursive practices are involved in the emergence of conceptual coherence 
and continuity during joint (e.g., classroom) activities. 
In this chapter, I articulate an analytical framework that, although sharing most of the 
premises of current sociocultural and situative approaches, leads to a type of unit of 
analysis that is different from those depicted in figure 2 in that it includes not only the 
irreducible relation between subjects and their material and social environments, but 
also their transactions as these unfold in time. As a result, the material features of 
interaction, rather than being left outside of the analysis, fall within the analytical 
lenses as inherent but differentiated aspects of the unit as a whole (Figure 3). The 
framework builds upon the works of soviet psychologist Lev S. Vygotsky and 
American pragmatist John Dewey. Similarities and complementarities between 
Dewey and Vygotsky, and, more generally, between Marxist and Pragmatist 
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philosophies, have been the object of several publications (e.g., Garrison, 1995, 2001; 
Glassman, 2001; Miettinen, 2001, 2006; Russell, 1993; Stetsenko, 2008) and the 
source of analytical developments in the learning sciences (e.g., Clancey, 2011; Hall, 
1996). In science education, Dewey’s ideas have motivated a number of analytical 
developments. Based on Dewey’s ideas, a group of scholars have advanced notions 
of aesthetic understanding as an important aspect of science education (e.g., Pugh, 
2011; Wong, 2007; Wong et al., 2001). In several works, Hamza, Wickman, and 
colleagues have developed a pragmatist and situative approach to analyze classroom 
interactions that builds upon Deweyan premises, and which aims to understand how 
contingent aspects of activity are involved in the development of conceptual 
understandings (e.g., Hamza & Wickman, 2009, 2013; Wickman, 2006; Wickman & 
Östman, 2002). The framework elaborated in this chapter, although definitely 
informed by these other developments, reflects and expands original work developed 
as part of this thesis (Jornet, Roth, and Krange, submitted; Roth and Jornet, 2013, 
2014). 
I begin by articulating the historical and conceptual grounds on which Vygotsky’s 
cultural-historical theory develops, and then I elaborate on a distinction already 
introduced in Chapter 1 between two alternate forms of analysis, analysis by elements 
and analysis by units (Vygotsky, 2012). An analysis by units, grounded on a 
dialectical materialist tradition of thought, allows for an elaboration of how the 
distinct interactional aspects are reflexively related to the larger social events of 
collective coherence that become their outcome. In two following sections, I 
elaborate how. First, a unit of analysis that includes the unfolding of time/activity as 
an internal aspect of the phenomenon under study allows for (and demands) 
characterizing each individual (speech, gesture) act in its reflexive relation to the 
whole event (activity) that is being investigated. In this regard, I discuss the notion of 
semiotic mediation (Vygotsky, 1978), according to which the words, actions, and 
artifacts (i.e., signs) that are mobilized during, in, and for social activity become 
means for affecting and controlling one’s own behavior.  
Second, as I elaborate in a third section, because the reflexive relation between 
individuals and their contexts of collective activity is seen as unfolding in time, 
neither the individual subjects nor the talk and actions that they perform can be fully 
accounted for from the perspective of already known linguistic or intellectual 
categories. This is so because, in the midst of unfolding activity, neither teachers nor 
students can know in advance what order their own actions and words will bring 
forth. Thus, to understand individual and collective activities in their mutual process 
of becoming coherent, we need to adopt the first-time-through perspective of the 
participants, who are both active agents and passive subjects of their own bodily 
engagement with others and with materials. Before a sign comes to mediate an 
individual’s activity, and therefore her competence to perceive and conceptualize 
different aspects of engagement into a coherent whole, there must be a transition 
from the immediate experience of a lived-in situation to its articulation as an ordered 
field of action. Both Dewey in his notion of experience, and Vygotsky in the Russian 
perezhivanie, laid down the foundations for a unit of analysis capable of capturing 
this transformative process of mutual constitution between subjects and their objects 
during instrumental, tool-mediated activity. 
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Analysis by units 
Cultural-historical psychology as a dialectical materialist approach 
The analytical perspective that frames the work of this thesis is grounded in the 
cultural-historical approach founded by Vygotsky in the Russia of the 1920’s and 
1930’s. Central to the historical emergence and development of this approach was 
Vygotsky’s concern with overcoming the crisis that he found dominating the field of 
psychology during his time. According to Vygotsky (1997/2004), the different extant 
disciplines in psychological research—which included behaviorism, reflexology, 
psychoanalysis, and Gestalt psychology, among others—had failed to provide a 
consistent and unified account of the most fundamental problem of psychology, 
namely the relation between consciousness and behavior. Through exhaustive meta-
theoretical analysis, Vygotsky came to the conclusion that these diverse disciplines 
could be reduced to “two different, irreconcilable types of science, two 
fundamentally different constructions of systems of knowledge … a natural 
scientific, materialistic one and a spiritualistic one” (p. 299). These two coexisting 
modes of doing and conceptualizing research resulted in a number of apparently 
insurmountable dichotomies: whereas the first approach aimed to understand 
psychological phenomena in terms of causality, the latter organized its object of 
research in terms of ideal intentions; whereas the former aimed at description, the 
latter aimed at explanation; whereas the former aimed to deal with mental aspects, the 
latter was concerned only with the material. From either side, an adequate account of 
both the material and the ideal aspects of consciousness seemed to be unattainable. 
To overcome the dichotomies between theory and practice, and between 
consciousness and behavior that derived from the empiricist and metaphysical 
methodologies of “the two psychologies,” Vygotsky argued that it was necessary to 
develop a dialectical materialist approach. Accordingly, the analytical concepts of 
the “new psychology” should not be abstract in the classical sense given by formal 
logic, but should retain the concrete aspects of the object under investigation: “the 
dialectic unity of methodology and practice, applied to psychology from two sides, is 
the fate and destiny of one of the psychologies” (p. 309). Vygotsky exemplifies this 
formal notion of abstraction discussing the notion of reflex—an emerging 
explanatory principle in the psychological discussions of the time (see, e.g., Dewey, 
1896): “a reflex is an abstract concept; methodologically it is extremely valuable, but 
it cannot become the fundamental concept of psychology as a concrete science of 
human behavior” (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 9, emphasis added; see also Vygotsky, 1989). 
Importantly, the use of the notion concrete in cultural-historical theory is not the 
same as that typically made in the classical empiricist and metaphysical traditions. 
Thus, concrete here is not the material instantiation of an abstract category. Rather, 
following Marx (1857/1971), “the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration 
of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” (p. 101). Understanding a 
phenomenon in the concrete, therefore, means understanding it as “an organic system 
of mutually conditioning phenomena” [by contrast] to a metaphysical conception of it 
as a mechanical agglomeration of immutable constituent parts that are linked with 
each other only externally, more or less accidentally” (Ilyenkov, 2008, p. 33). 
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Analysis by elements and unit analysis 
In Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky (2012/1986) materializes the dialectical 
materialist approach that he had only outlined in the works cited above. Central to 
this work is a distinction between analysis by elements and analysis by units (or unit 
analysis). As Vygotsky writes, “Two essentially different modes of analysis are 
possible in the study of psychological structures… The first method analyzes 
complex psychological wholes into elements” (p. 4, original emphasis). To clarify 
this first method, the psychologist recurs to an analogy with the chemical analysis of 
water. In the analogy, an analysis into elements would take hydrogen and oxygen as 
the primary units of analysis. As Vygotsky notes, the advantage of such an analysis is 
that it leads to formal generalizations: “the chemical formula for water is equally 
applicable to the water in a great ocean and to the water in a raindrop” (p. 5). 
However, precisely because neither hydrogen nor oxygen retains the properties of the 
whole (water), “the student applying this method in looking for the explanation of 
some property of water—why it extinguishes fire, for example—will find to his 
surprise that hydrogen burns and oxygen sustains fire” (p. 4). 
Neuropsychologist Alexander R. Luria, Vygotsky’s colleague and follower, further 
characterizes this approach as typical of what he terms classical science: “Classical 
scholars look upon events in terms of their constituent parts. Step by step they single 
out … elements until they can formulate abstract, general laws. These laws are then 
seen as the governing agents of the phenomena … under study” (Luria, 1979, p. 174). 
As a result, the dynamics of the properties of the “living whole” (Cole, 2005, p. 40) 
are reduced to abstract categories. Just as is the case in the example of water, 
Vygotsky (2012/1986) argued, the approaches that take verbal thinking—i.e., word 
meaning—and actual speech—i.e., word phonemes—to be independent elements of 
analysis, cannot provide an adequate account of verbal thinking—the object of study 
in Thinking and Speech—as a concrete and unitary phenomenon. 
By contrast, an analysis by units aims at retaining the properties of the whole under 
study. It involves finding that concrete and dynamic aspect of the phenomenon of 
interest “that is further unanalyzable and yet retains the properties of the whole” (p. 
5). Rather than reducing the phenomenon through formal abstraction, the aim is to 
retain its richness in the analytical concepts. By contrast to the “classical” approach, 
unit analysis is characteristic of what Luria (1979) calls romantic science:  “romantic 
scholars … do not follow the path of reductionism… [they] want neither to split 
living reality into its elementary components nor to represent the wealth of life’s 
concrete events in abstract models” (p. 174); the goal is “to preserve the wealth of 
living reality” (p. 174). 
In the case of the study of verbal thinking, Vygotsky (2012) finds such a minimal unit 
in word meaning. Word meaning, as a concrete aspect of the world, captures both the 
material (e.g., phonetic) and the ideal dimensions of consciousness. That is, in word 
meaning, thinking and speech are united. “A word without meaning is an empty 
sound” just as “the meaning of every word is a generalization or a concept … a 
phenomenon of thinking” (p. 225). Importantly, it is not that meaning exists in two 
separated domains, word and thought. Rather, word and thought are dialectically 
connected to each other: “Word meaning is a phenomenon of thought only insofar as 
thought is embodied in speech, and of speech only insofar as speech is connected 
with thought” (p. 223). It is in the concrete act of speaking—rather than in the 
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abstract analytical category—that thinking and word are united (on this point, see 
Bakhtin, 1993). 
Thinking coherence from a unit analysis perspective: self-movement and 
diachronical historicity 
When conceptual coherence, as social event, is approached from a unit analysis 
perspective, we need to move away from a synchronic view of the interactional 
processes that both analysts and participants recognize as leading to coherence. Those 
processes, as concrete and real, unfold in time and space. It is precisely in their 
concrete unfolding, in their detailed elaboration, that they provide both researchers 
and participants with the resources to produce and understand them, in situ, as 
achievements of coherence rather than of confusion, divergence, or any other 
possible state of affairs. From this view, therefore, achievements of conceptual 
coherence—as any other cognitive achievement as achievement, as something that 
was not but now becomes—are self-moving phenomena. That is, they develop not 
because of external forces but because of their own internal organization. 
Accordingly, the starting point of analysis cannot be an abstraction—a one-sided 
aspect of the phenomenon, such as an individual’s knowledge or a given discursive 
practice—but the episode of coherence achievement as a concrete whole. It is with 
regard to the whole that all other elements can be meaningfully described as part of 
its internal historicity. Importantly, the notion of history here does not mean to 
describe the chronological succession of synchronic occurrences that are then to be 
integrated by formal analysis into a sort of a backward reading, as would be the case 
with the units of analysis depicted in Figure 2. It rather involves beginning by 
identifying the episode as a whole and then tracing its genesis by reading it forward. 
As anthropologist Tim Ingold poses it, the analysis must begin with “a world that 
already coheres, where things and events occur or take place, rather than a world of 
disconnected particulars that has to be rendered coherent, or joined up after the fact, 
in the theoretical imagination” (Ingold, 2011, p. 251). Only then can we begin to 
trace the history of how the different aspects of interaction are integrated to constitute 
a coherent whole and thus achieve a causal-genetic (Vygotsky, 2012) account of how 
context and cognition are related to each other in the joint establishment of 
conceptual coherence in and across activities. 
The type of unit depicted in Figure 3 includes the temporal dimension that is 
otherwise abstracted in the unit depicted in Figure 2. It therefore includes the final 
result of a particular course of concrete activity (e.g., a coherence achievement) along 
with the concrete process of its integration through interactional materials. Yet, figure 
3 does not elaborate on the reflexive connections that unite the different concrete 
elements (i.e., individual actions) to the whole collective activity. Nor does it 
elaborate on precisely which elements are to be included as fundamental. To achieve 
an operative unit of analysis for the study of the endogenous production of episodes 
of conceptual coherence, I turn to elaborate on two important analytical resources. 
The first one is the notion of mediation as developed by Vygotsky, which addresses 
how individual actions, through the introduction of signs, transform the ongoing 
activities and, by virtue of transforming collective activity, come to transform their 
own ways of participating in and reasoning about collective activity. The second is 
the notion of experience as a unit of analysis, which both Vygotsky and Dewey 
 Extended Abstract  
 
34 
developed to account for how processes of transformation in collective activity 
became an aspect of individual consciousness. 
 
Semiotic mediation 
A central premise in cultural-historical psychology is that the relation between what a 
person does and the contextual situation in which she finds herself is not direct but 
mediated by instrumental activity with cultural tools and signs. Vygotsky was 
convinced that central to the foundation of a new psychology was the formation of a 
concept of human consciousness that should capture the specifically human features 
not just in quantitative terms, but also as qualitatively distinct from those of other 
species. Just as recent situated cognition scholars have critiqued the information-
processing approaches for explaining both perceptual and conceptual processes in 
terms of symbolic processing (e.g., Clancey, 1997), Vygotsky critiqued the 
connectionist approaches of his time, which “emphasized that one and the same type 
of physiological connections stands behind elementary as well as higher mental 
functions” (Vygotsky, 2012, p. 117), the only difference being “the number of 
connections” (p. 117). Following a dialectical materialist stance, Vygotsky found the 
key in the unity of human cognition and the specific cultural forms that most 
uniquely define humans’ activity: the use of tools and language in instrumental 
activity. Rather than assuming the classical stimulus-response (S-R) model of a direct 
relation between context and behavior, Vygotsky proposed that the relation comes to 
be mediated by the introduction of signs during joint activity with others. As he 
wrote, “between the stimulus to which behavior is directed and the person’s reaction, 
a new intermediate member intervenes and the whole operation assumes the character 
of a mediated act” (Vygotsky, 2004/1997, p. 360).  
To exemplify how subject and object come to be indirectly related by social means of 
interaction (i.e., signs), Vygotsky describes the development of the pointing gesture 
as an indicatory sign, which, according to him, “plays an important role in the 
development of the child’s speech and in general is largely the historic basis of all 
higher forms of behavior” (Vygotsky, 1981, p. 160).  In the case of the toddler who 
does not yet master cultural means of communication, and who attempts to grasp 
something, there is at first a direct and natural relation between her and her objective 
context. Her gesture is “simply [an] unsuccessful grasping movement directed toward 
an object and denoting a future action” (p. 160). The situation is transformed, 
Individual
Situation
Individual
Situation
Concrete Activity
Figure 3: Transactional unit of analysis
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however, when the mother recognizes the child’s unsuccessful grasping as a pointing 
gesture and comes to help her. Thus, the child’s gesture, rather than eliciting a 
reaction in the object, comes to elicit a social relation: “there arises a reaction not on 
the part of the object, but on the part of another person” (p. 161). There is no longer a 
chain of action-reactions between child and environment. A relation with others 
mediates the relation with the object. A spontaneous action becomes a directing sign 
for others. This is the first important aspect of mediation: concrete, material aspects 
of natural interaction acquire relations of signification in and through joint 
engagement with others; signs are means to influence others. 
From this derives a second function: signs as means to influence oneself’s actions, as 
means of individual thinking. Thus, by virtue of having become a means of social 
interaction, the gesture can be grasped as a sign by the child too. The child can now 
internalize it as a means to relate to himself. As Vygotsky argued, “it is through 
others that we develop into ourselves” (p. 161). Vygotsky captured these two aspects 
of mediation in his general law of cultural development: 
“Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice, or on 
two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the 
psychological plane. First it appears between people as an 
interpsychological category, and then within the child as an 
intrapsychological category” (p. 163). 
Vygotsky’s notion of mediation and its associated theory of cognitive development 
have important implications for the study of conceptual coherence. First, according to 
this view, the emergence of coherence is not a property or achievement of the 
individual mind, but a property of a societal relation (e.g., classroom activity) as a 
whole. Contrary to the classical Saussurian characterization of signs as tokens of an 
already existing formal system of meaning (i.e., language as langue in Saussure’s 
terminology), from a Vygotskyan perspective signs are seen as integrated in a 
coherent system of signification by virtue of becoming means for the organization of 
concrete societal activity. Accordingly, coherence emerges as (i.e., is itself) a 
coordination of activity in which particular actions and tools (i.e., signs) acquire 
particular functions with regard to particular purposes. This point aligns with that 
made by other pragmatist and dialogically oriented scholars, such as Wittgenstein 
(1953/1967), Ryle (1949/1963), Dewey (1938), or Bakhtin (1981), who reject a view 
of language as a stable logical system and argue for views of language as a fluid 
aspect of living practice (Roth, 2014). It is this aspect that appears to have received 
most attention in recent ecological approaches to coherence and continuity in science 
and mathematics education, where studies have been concerned with the question of 
how learning materials such as computer simulations (e.g., Furberg, Kluge, & 
Ludvigsen, 2013) or traditional line graphs (e.g., Lobato et al., 2012), rather than 
repositories of information, become structuring resources in and through situated 
classroom activity. 
A second aspect that derives from the semiotic framework elaborated above is that, 
because they can only be elaborated with regard to the activity as a whole, the 
functions and purposes of an activity—and, therefore, the relations of signification 
that emerge during activity—cannot be grasped in advance, but only after activity has 
been already carried out. The latter point has important implications for how we 
account for the role of individuals in establishing relations of coherence during 
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activity, because it implies that individual participants cannot be in full control of the 
actual consequences of what they do and say, and therefore—contrary to individual 
and social constructivist accounts—cannot aim at constructing what they do not yet 
know (Roth, 2011). This is particularly the case for students, who find themselves in 
a situation similar to that of the child in Vygotsky’s example of the pointing gesture, 
where “the child is the last to become conscious of his/her gesture” (Vygotsky, 1981, 
p. 161). Rather than the result of something already known, it is by being part of the 
situation in which the gesture acquires a particular function that the possibility of 
mastering intentional tools for controlling others’ and one’s own behavior emerges. 
Thus, as it has been noted in the fields of sociology (e.g., Giddens, 1979), social 
studies of science (Pickering, 1995), cognitive archaeology (e.g., Malafouris, 2013), 
and anthropology (e.g., Ingold, 2013), individual intentions are an outcome and not a 
premise of social interaction. 
In the literature on science education, however, this latter aspect has received much 
less attention, as discussed in length in two recent volumes (Roth 2011, 2013). Thus, 
even when analytical frameworks are elaborated in line with Vygotskyan premises of 
semiotic mediation, microgenetic analyses tend to treat individual actions, utterances, 
and tools mobilized during interaction in terms of what participants already know, 
often assuming that an underlying intellectual process of, e.g., meaning-making 
precedes each concrete action. As discussed in Chapter 2, a risk of this is that, despite 
postulating a dialectical relation between subjects and environments, individual 
intentions either become independent explanatory causes of activity or are dissolved 
as indistinguishable aspects of social discursive practices. Discussing alternative 
ecological approaches to the problem of transfer, Packer (2001) notes precisely the 
latter challenge when he wonders, “doesn’t the sociocultural conception of cognition 
risk dissolving the person into whatever community of practice, whatever language 
game, they happen to be a member of?” (p. 501). 
Although the cultural-historical framework discussed above does provide important 
conceptual tools to address this question, several researchers have pointed out that 
further methodological development needs to be undertaken to account for the 
individual as a moment of the social unit of analysis that the premise of semiotic 
mediation implies (e.g., Packer, 2001; Stetsenko & Arievitch, 2004). What is the unit 
of analysis that shall allow us to investigate social achievements of coherence and 
continuity as phenomena of change without either reifying its individual elements as 
self-sufficient explanatory causes of activity or dissolving those individual elements 
as undifferentiated aspects of the whole? Throughout my doctoral studies, I have 
found the ideas of American pragmatist John Dewey particularly useful to address 
this question. It is to those ideas that I turn in the next section. 
Experience as a unit of self-movement 
In this section, I discuss how Dewey’s ideas about experience as an irreducible 
category that extends in space—across individuals and environment—and time—
across a changing situation—provide a useful basis for addressing the challenges 
exposed above, and one that is consistent with the cultural-historical approach 
described above. First, I frame Dewey’s contributions as part of his attempts to 
overcome the classical view of logic. According to the latter, rational forms consist of 
a set of ordered and ordering self-standing symbols. Instead, Dewey aimed to bring 
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logic back to the domain of lived-in joint instrumental activity. Then, I elaborate on 
his ideas of experience as an analytical category. 
From formal to naturalistic logic 
A central concern in Dewey’s work was to develop a naturalistic view of logic that 
would overcome the limitations of both empiricist and rationalist approaches. Rather 
than grounded in a set of self-standing knowledge entities apprehended by reason, or 
as immediate sense data, Dewey argued that “rational operations grow out of organic 
activities” (Dewey, 1938, p. 19). According to him, there is interdependence between 
particular courses of “organic activity” and the rational forms that such activities lead 
to. Importantly, “rational operations grow out of organic activities, without being 
identical with that from which they emerge” (p. 19). Thus, the forms of activity that 
lead to forms of logic should not be confused with the latter. Accordingly, organic 
life cannot be accounted for in terms of the formal elements of logic that it leads to. 
Importantly, in using the words “organic” and “naturalistic,” Dewey does not mean to 
exclude the cultural dimension, but seeks a cultural naturalism (p. 20). As he writes, 
“man is naturally a being that lives in association with other in communities 
possessing language” (p. 19, original emphasis). 
To develop a naturalistic logic, Dewey elaborates on the continuum of inquiry as the 
basic principle underlying the establishment and organization of rational activity. 
Accordingly, inquiry is the situated, instrumental, and operational process of 
transforming “an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original 
situation into a unified whole” (p. 104, original emphasis). All logical forms (e.g., the 
formal symbols in a mathematical formula, the words in a proposition such as “the 
cat is on the mat”) are means-consequence relations that emerge during situated 
inquiry. As he poses it, “rationality as an abstract conception is precisely the 
generalized idea of the means-consequence relation as such” (p. 10). On this account, 
coherence is not given by a particular arrangement of forms and structures in 
themselves, but emerges as “doing and making” are involved, “which determines 
means … of effecting a prospective end, a unified situation, as a consequence” (p. 
461). It is by reference to a unified situation that the different emerging forms—
material and procedural—come to be integrated as forming part of a larger coherent 
whole. Just as in Vygotsky signs emerge as part of an ongoing societal relation, for 
Dewey “words mean what they mean in connection with conjoint activities that effect 
a common, or mutually participated in, consequence” (p. 53). The similarities of 
Dewey’s thinking with the idea of activity as a minimal unit of analysis are here 
noticeable. Yet, to fully grasp the analytical implications that this view on coherence 
has, it is important to analyze the particular sense in which Dewey uses the notion of 
situation, and how it is related to experience. 
Irreducibility of situation and experience 
Dewey’s philosophy involves a rejection of Cartesian dualism and an elaboration of 
how organism and environment are intrinsically related as a unit of life. Central to 
such an elaboration is his notion of situation:  
“What is designated by the word ‘situation’ is not a single object or 
event or set of objects and events. For we never experience nor form 
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judgments about objects and events in isolation, but only in connection 
with a contextual whole” (p. 66). 
A situation, therefore, is a contextual whole. It is only as part of such a contextual 
whole that any individual experience unfolds. As Dewey and Bentley (1999/1949) 
clearly remark,  
“the word ‘experience’ should be dropped entirely from discussion 
unless held strictly to a single definite use: that, namely, of calling 
attention to the fact that Existence has organism and environment as its 
aspects, and cannot be identified with either as an independent isolate” 
(p. 193). 
Situation and experience, therefore, form an irreducible unity of organism and 
environment. In this regard, Dewey’s ideas are analogous to those sketched by 
Vygotsky (1994) about perezhivanie [experience], which the Russian psychologist 
considers as “a unity of environmental and personal features” (p. 343). This unity 
extends both in time and in space. Experience extends in space in the sense that it is 
not seen as internal to the individual; it “does not go on simply inside a person” 
(Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 39). It has, too, objective consequences in the material 
environment. Thus, “every genuine experience has an active side which changes in 
some degree the objective conditions under which further experiences are had” (p. 
39). It is this realization that leads Dewey to formulate the principle of continuity, 
according to which “every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who 
acts and undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the 
quality of subsequent experiences” (p. 35). Hence, experience is a moving force that 
leads to transformation of both the individual and her environment as it changes the 
objective conditions in which further experiences are had.  
Experience as an analytical category 
In most literature about learning and education, the notion of experience, whether it is 
seen as an abstract mental process or as a social phenomenon, tends to be treated as 
an unproblematic aspect of the phenomena investigated (Roth & Jornet, 2014). In 
Dewey, however, experience is not an object of analysis but an analytical category 
that captures a process of living, of situated activity or inquiry. This is made very 
clear in, for example, Knowing and the Known (Dewey & Bentley, 1999/1949), 
where it is stated that experience is “neither subjective nor objective but … a method 
or system of organization” (p. 115, emphasis added). Experience is not a thing that 
individuals “have,” but is, as the quotation says, a method, a system of organization. 
Similarly, Vygotsky (1994) considers perezhivanie—the Russian equivalent term for 
experience—as one of “a few such units with which psychological research operates” 
(p. 342). As a unit of analysis of personal development, however, Vygotsky never 
developed perezhivanie to the extent that he developed the unit of word meaning for 
the study of verbal thinking (Rey, 2009, 2011). In Dewey, on the other hand, we find 
an elaborated description of the category of experience throughout several of his 
latter works.  
In Art as Experience (Dewey, 1934/2008a), Dewey makes a distinction between the 
general stream of experience and an experience. He defines the latter as that 
experience which “is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and 
 Analytical Framework 39 
 
self-sufficiency” (p. 42). After the fact, an experience “has a unity that gives it its 
name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship” (p. 44). An experience is, 
therefore, that experience that can subsequently, after it has already reached a 
determinate conclusion, be named. In this regard, Dewey sees having an experience 
as the precondition for semiotic mediation to take place. It is as long as we go 
through some event that has both temporal extension and a determinate terminus that 
we can jointly refer to it as something distinct from the flow of experience itself as a 
whole. As he writes in Logic, “a universe of experience is the precondition of a 
universe of discourse” (Dewey, 1938, p. 38). 
This characterization contains a view of experience as a diachronic category in which 
two aspects or moments are differentiated: one that involves a temporal unfolding of 
the experience as an ongoing event, and a second one that retains the event as a whole 
and that can therefore be grasped by a category or label, such as a word or a gesture. 
As a unit of analysis, thus, an experience implies a moving of itself, as ongoing 
process, and towards itself as final outcome. It involves self-movement. Within it, 
Dewey argues, neither organism nor environment can be seen as either static or in 
constant change, but both as becoming and as actuality. In this regard, there is in an 
experience both an aspect of doing and an aspect of undergoing. Accordingly, 
individuals cannot be seen as active agents only, but must be seen also as receptive 
and passive. “The undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves surrender” 
(Dewey, 1934/2008a, p. 59); it involves an element of “suffering in its large sense” 
(p. 47). Thus, as an aspect of experience as a becoming, the individual cannot be seen 
as acting only on the basis of what she already knows or what she already is, but must 
be seen as undergoing a process of transformation, as going through an adventure 
that cannot be reduced to the intellectual but must most centrally involve the 
affective. During an experience, Dewey writes, “the old self is put off and the new 
self is only forming, and the form it finally takes will depend upon the unforeseeable 
result of an adventure” (Dewey, 1929, p. 246). 
From interaction to transaction 
Throughout this chapter, I have presented a number of conceptual and analytical tools 
that were conceived for the study of the emergence and development of new cultural 
and intellectual competences. The notion of mediation allows for an analysis of how 
material cultural tools are involved in the genesis of intellectual competences as we 
engage with others in joint activities. The notion of experience, as unity of organism 
and environment, allows for an approach to mediation that does not take the latter 
only as a transitive process that brings a subject from one state of development to 
another, but also elaborates on how both subject and environment are transformed 
during this process.  
The framework presented above, which combines ideas about mediation with ideas 
about the analytical category experience, involves a shift from a unit of analysis that 
focuses on inter-action (Figure 2) to a transactional unit (Figure 3). The former, 
Dewey & Bentley (1999/1949) note, is directed to the study of phenomena that are 
composed of several independent elements, and includes such cases as when 
“selves are said to inter-act with each other or with environmental 
objects; when small portions of organisms are said to inter-act with 
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environmental objects as in the traditional theories of sensation; when 
minds and portions of matter in separate realms are brought by the 
epistemologies into pseudo-interactional forms; or, probably worst of 
all, when a word’s meaning is severed from the word’s actual presence 
in man’s behavior, like a sort of word-soul from a word-body” (p. 133). 
Transaction, by contrast, refers to the analytical procedure “where systems of 
description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, 
without final attribution to ‘elements’ … ‘entities,’ ‘essences,’ or ‘realities,’ and 
without isolation of presumptively detachable ‘relations’” (p. 133). A transactional 
approach, consistent with a unit analysis, is concerned with describing phenomena in 
their genesis and development. With regard to the problem of continuity that 
concerns us here, it pursues an elaboration of how the material elements involved in 
the actual interactions that lead to episodes of conceptual coherence relate to the 
larger unfolding whole. Most importantly, a transactional approach demands 
considering each of those elements, including the individual participants and the 
materials they participate with, as immersed in a process of becoming. This has the 
following important implications, all of which involve substituting a backwards 
reading in which the final outcome of what are actual courses of action is set as the 
antecedent cause with a first-time-through forward reading of the relation between 
the course of actions and the whole that comes to be its outcome. 
First, the cultural tools and signs involved in classroom activities must be approached 
not in final form but in their process of formation. Thus, scientific and disciplinary 
talk, as well as such teaching materials as experiments, texts, graphs, or digital 
simulations, must not be studied as already standing for or representing given 
knowledge or meanings, but must be followed in their transition from first appearing 
as presentations in immediate experience to their being represented through 
communicational activity. It is through situated communicational activity that what 
first appears in experience as presence comes to be related to, or viewed as standing 
for, some other event or thing. In this, the observed discursive practices shall not be 
read backwards and posited as antecedent conditions of the learning process under 
development. 
Second, the individual contributions that lead to the emergence of new forms of 
social organization involving signs and tools—such as new ways of talking science in 
the classroom (Lemke, 1990)—cannot be described as the implementation of already 
formed individual cognitive competences or understandings, but must be accounted 
for in their process of formation. Individual cognitive functions such as perception, 
recognition, inference, or understanding shall neither be ignored nor accounted for as 
standing against the cultural signs and tools that are being perceived, recognized, 
inferred, or understood. These cognitive competences, too, are to be seen as 
distributed across space and time, and, therefore, must be described as moments of 
the larger unfolding social activity of coherence formation. As has been discussed 
above, there is in experience an aspect of receptivity during which individuals cannot 
be regarded as being in rational control of what they do and of what their actions lead 
them into. 
Finally, both points raised above imply abandoning an intellectualist reading of 
situated activity in which linguistic aspects of interaction alone are given primacy in 
the organization of activity. The performative and bodily dimensions must be 
 Analytical Framework 41 
 
addressed in their relation to the emergence of intellectual competence. The full-
person-in-activity, rather than just her intellect, is the object of study. This is how 
Vygotsky describes perezhivanie: as a unity of both affective and intellectual aspects. 
For Vygotsky, an approach focusing only on the intellectual dimensions is 
problematic because “it makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow of 
‘thoughts thinking themselves,’ segregated from the fullness of life, from the 
personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker” (Vygotsky, 
2012, p. 10). For Dewey, too, intellectual thinking alone cannot be the ground out of 
which intellect grows because, in the philosopher’s words, rational “operations grow 
out of organic activities, without being identical with that from which they emerge” 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 18, emphasis added). That is, according to Dewey, intellectual 
growth cannot be explained by “prior conceptual construction” (p. 24). Rather, it 
must be grounded in what he calls the organization of “organic life” (p. 25). Thus, a 
focus on organic life involves a focus on processes of sense- and form-making as 
performative processes. This implies that sense- and form-making involve both 
intention and improvisation, both bodies and minds, in irreducible connection. Yet, 
although often recognizing bodily performances as important aspects of 
communication, sociocultural studies of classroom interaction tend to focus on 
spoken language (e.g., Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Mortimer & Scott, 2003). A 
transactional framework implies complementing these sociocultural-oriented studies 
with an account of the emergence of conceptual coherence while attending to 
empirical research that suggests the importance of bodily engagement with materials 
as a precursor to mastering symbolic forms of representation in science and 
mathematics education (e.g., Alibali et al., 2014; Hwang & Roth, 2013; Novack et 
al., 2014; Roth, 2000). 
  
Chapter 4 – Research Setting and 
Methods 
Throughout chapters 2 and 3, I discussed the close relation that exists between 
particular theoretical technologies and the empirical objects they produce. The aim of 
this chapter is to describe the methodic practices by means of which I have 
constructed the empirical objects presented in my empirical studies, and how those 
practices relate to the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3. First, as part of 
the research setting, I describe the MIRACLE project, the larger research project as 
part of which I have conducted my empirical studies. As a PhD candidate enrolled in 
the project, I have been actively involved in all phases of the process, including 
design, implementation, data collection, empirical analysis, and dissemination. Here, 
I provide a brief account of the project’s general motives and how they relate to my 
own research purposes. In subsequent sections, I describe the data collection 
procedures and the data corpus. In doing so, I pay particular attention to the analyses 
of video recordings of social interaction, which are the core data source for my 
studies, providing a discussion of how interaction analysis, and in particular the 
ethnomethodological framework that informs it, is an adequate technique to analyze 
social interaction from the perspective that the unit of analysis developed in chapter 3 
provides. I conclude the chapter with a consideration of validity, generalization, and 
ethics issues. 
The MIRACLE project 
The general aim of the MIRACLE project is to design, develop, and investigate 
technology-supported pedagogical solutions for connecting science education 
activities across occasions and settings. The project focuses on the socioscientific 
topic of energy for the future. This topic is part of the natural sciences curriculum in 
Norwegian upper secondary schools and, at the time of the project’s establishment, 
was the planned topic for a new interactive exhibition in the Norwegian Museum of 
Science and Technology. Building upon this shared interest, the MIRACLE project 
arranged an interdisciplinary collaborative process in which a team of museum 
conservators, exhibition designers, learning and computer scientists, and educators 
participated to develop a curriculum that would foster the students’ conceptual 
understanding of socioscientific issues by participating in activities across the school 
and the museum. 
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Throughout the collaborative design process, the different participants’ interests and 
concerns with regard to the project’s implementation were discussed and negotiated 
in meetings, workshops, and seminars. In several studies documenting this 
collaborative process, we have identified two central concerns that emerged during 
the collaborative work, and which became driving motives in shaping the project’s 
technological and pedagogical solutions (Jahreie & Krange, 2011; Jahreie et al., 
2011; Jornet & Jahreie, 2013).  
The first concern involves considerations of how different forms of explorative 
engagement in the classroom and the science museum can be related to the 
development of conceptual understandings of curricular (socioscientific) issues. The 
concern has historical roots in pedagogical practices spread through science centers 
and museums during the most recent decades, where there is an increased interest in 
implementing interactive and engaging exhibitions to make scientific knowledge 
more accessible and appealing for the general public (e.g., Allen, 2004; Falk & 
Dierking, 2000; Oppenheim, 1968). The concern has also been central in science 
education, where educational reforms for over a half-century in the US (Pea & 
Collins, 2008) and the UK (Hodson, 1996) have included notions of learner-centered 
and inquiry learning as central to curriculum development. 
The second concern involves how to make use of and combine diverse digital and 
analog technologies to facilitate the use of learning experiences in one activity/setting 
as resources for conceptual understanding during latter activities in the curricular 
trajectory. This concern also finds parallel in the respective disciplines, where there is 
a growing interest in implementing computer-supported forms of hands-on 
engagement and conceptual scaffolding in the classroom (e.g., Koschmann, 1996; 
Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2004; Linn, Davis, & Bell, 2004) and in the science museum 
(e.g., Parry, 2010; Falk & Dierking, 2008; Hall & Bannon, 2006). 
To address the issues discussed above, MIRACLE has developed a technology-
supported inquiry-based approach with an explicit focus on providing technological 
resources for teachers and students to draw connections across different activities, 
artifacts, and representations throughout the curriculum. In this regard, three key 
interrelated strategies in MIRACLE’s particular approach can be identified: 
providing multiple linked representations, combining open inquiry with teacher-led 
summary sessions, and providing opportunities to revisit and revise learning 
products throughout the curricular trajectory. In the following, I discuss how these 
aspects relate to the research literature on science learning and describe the particular 
tools that have been developed to support them. 
Providing multiple linked representations.  
Building on research showing that multiple linked representations offer promise in 
fostering deep conceptual understanding of scientific issues when implemented as 
part of inquiry-based learning activities (e.g., Ainsworth, 2008; Lee et al., 2010; 
Rutten, van Joolingen, & van der Veen, 2012), one of the central approaches in the 
MIRACLE project has been the design and development of multiple ways of 
presenting similar or related scientific phenomena across settings and activities. To 
that aim, heat pumps were used as a means to address many of the more general 
socioscientific issues related to energy. Different representations of heat pumps and 
of the processes involved in their functioning were made available in the form of 
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tangible phenomena during hands-on experiments and dynamically linked digital 
simulations in the classroom and in the museum. An example is given in Figure 4, 
where we can see how the students interact with (a) a spray-can of compressed air 
that exhibits evaporation and condensation phenomena, (b) a digitally enhanced 
exhibit in the museum that displays evaporation and condensation phenomena taking 
place inside a heat pump, and (c) a more elaborate simulation of evaporation and 
condensation processes in heat pumps in the classroom setting. 
 
 
Figure 4: Multiple representations of related scientific phenomena. 
Combining inquiry with teacher-led summary sessions 
During the most recent decades, the implementation of and research on inquiry-based 
learning environments has received increasing attention in the field of science 
education (Hmelo-Silver, Duncan, & Chinn, 2007; Hofstein & Lunetta, 1982, 2004). 
As several reviews show, a consistent finding across the extensive literature is the 
observation that inquiry-based instruction is an effective means for teaching science 
as long as it provides adequate supporting tools and scaffolding (Anderson, 2002; 
Edelson & Reiser, 2006; Hmelo-Silver et al., 2007; Minner, Levy, & Century, 2010). 
As part of this scaffolding, research into the role of classroom communication has 
shown that the role of teachers’ sum-up discussions (e.g., Mercer, 2000; Scott et al, 
2011) and questioning practices (e.g., Roth, 1996; Scott et al., 2006) is of particular 
relevance. In line with this research, MIRACLE develops a curricular trajectory 
where activities in which groups of three to five students engage in guided inquiry 
and experimentation are combined with teacher-led summary sessions in which the 
experiences and products of inquiry are revisited and further discussed in plenum.  
Providing opportunities for revisiting and editing learning products 
In addition to focusing on the teacher’s role as a facilitator of the emergence of 
conceptual coherence and continuity through sum-up and recap practices, research 
has shown that supporting students’ deliberate collaboration on constructing shared 
knowledge objects facilitates the development of integrated disciplinary 
understandings during inquiry activities (Damsa et al., 2010; de Jong et al., 2010; 
Linn & Eylon, 2011). In line with this research, the MIRACLE project has arranged 
for a curriculum in which students have continued access to an online repository 
where their own and others’ learning products can be accessed, edited, and delivered 
as part of their course completion. As part of this, the project has designed an online 
platform for sharing digital products across the trajectory, including pictures, videos, 
and tweets that the students produced during inquiry activities. These products can be 
accessed through the trajectory and shared in, for example, plenary summary sessions 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Students record their hands-on experimentation (left), which is 
subsequently shared in plenary sessions for further discussion (right). 
Empirical settings and participants 
The MIRACLE project is driven by a design-based—also known as design 
experiment—research approach (Brown, 1992; Collins, 1992).  Design-based 
research is a means to investigate learning phenomena in the complexity of natural 
(e.g., classroom) settings, while at the same time retaining the aim of evaluating the 
impact in the learning outcomes of particular design aspects (Collins et al., 2004). 
This often leads to an iterative design process in which new tools and pedagogical 
solutions are tested and new theoretical models about learning generated (Cobb et al., 
2003). As a result, both the theoretical premises and the instructional designs and 
institutional practices involved in teaching/learning are revised with regard to 
emerging pedagogical goals (Krange & Ludvigsen, 2009). 
In line with its design-based research agenda, the MIRACLE project has conducted 
three iterations of design, implementation, and data collection (Table 1). As part of 
the first iteration, a pilot experimental setting featuring two different learning 
scenarios, a classroom and a museum space, was set up in a studio at the University 
of Oslo. The aim of the pilot study was to test initial developments and ideas, 
including early versions of the online platform (SciHub), of the digital simulations, of 
iPod-based applications for video and picture recording, and of a museum exhibit. 
Two groups of four students from an upper-secondary school and their teacher of 
natural sciences participated in the study. The two groups and their teacher went 
through a four-hour experimental sequence of activities that combined inquiry 
activities—including a set of physical experiments and a set of digital simulations—
with teacher-led interventions in which prior experiences were summed up and 
discussed with regard to curricular issues. In Study II (Jornet & Roth, in press), we 
document how one of these groups and their teacher drew conceptual connections 
across the entire trajectory of activities. 
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Table 1: Settings and participants. 
During the second iteration, the tools tested in the pilot study were refined and 
expanded for implementation in authentic school and museum settings. An entire 
class of 24 students between 16 and 17 years old from a public combined lower/upper 
secondary school in Oslo and their teacher of natural sciences participated in the 
study. The curriculum, implemented over a four-week period, consisted of 20 lecture 
hours spread across eight days, including a day visit to the Norwegian museum of 
science and technology. Study I (Jornet et al., submitted) draws from data collected 
during this implementation to examine an episode of transfer in which a group of 
students identified conceptual connections between a prior hands-on activity, a digital 
visualization, and a scientific law. 
The third iteration involved an expansion of the SciHub functionalities, including 
distinct interfaces for the teacher and the students, improved flow across the activities 
and documents available in the platform, and a tweeting functionality. In addition, a 
digitally enhanced exhibit was included in the museum space, and the digital 
simulations in the classroom were updated to correspond with the simulation in the 
museum. These developments were implemented in the same school and museum as 
the prior iteration. This study comprised 32 students and their science teacher. In 
Study III (Jornet, submitted), I draw from data collected during this implementation 
to investigate the teacher’s and the students’ communicative and bodily practices 
during sum-up plenary sessions in which videos, tweets, and other products were 
retrieved for discussion. 
Data collection procedures and data corpus 
The data sources from which my thesis draws have been collected as part of the 
MIRACLE project, and therefore they have been partly the result of collective 
decisions taken together with the larger group of researchers involved in the project. 
Prior to each implementation, the team met to discuss our respective research 
interests and to agree on the data collection procedures. To coordinate our activities, 
we generated data collection protocols in which the schedule, the tasks for each 
researcher involved in data collection, and the objectives of the data collection were 
specified. Common to all researchers in the MIRACLE team was an interest in 
cultural-historical approaches to design-based research (Krange & Ludvigsen, 2009), 
according to which the focus is on analyzing how the curricular interventions come to 
be taken up as mediational means of institutional practice. To document such 
processes of mediation, we collected different kinds of data sources throughout the 
three project implementations, as shown in Table 2. In the following, I describe those 
that had either core or secondary status in my thesis’ investigations. 
Type of data source Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 Status in my thesis 
Audio-visual 
recordings of 
classroom/museum 
interactions 
07:00 hours 26:05 hours 26:51 hours Core 
Audio-visual 
recordings of pre- and 
04:25 hours 05:20 hours 06:47 hours Secondary 
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post-interviews  
Pictures of settings, 
documents, and field 
notes 
Yes Yes Yes Secondary 
Digital log data and 
digital repository 
No No Yes Secondary 
Screen recordings No No 02:00 hours Secondary 
Pre- and post- 
questionnaires 
No No Yes Not used 
 
Table 2: Data corpus 
During the data collection, typically two to four researchers were present in the 
settings. We video recorded all curricular activities using one to four high-definition 
digital video cameras, depending on whether activities took place as plenary sessions 
or as work in groups. The use of video recording has increasingly been adopted as a 
research tool in the learning sciences for studying both classroom and out-of-school 
learning situations (Derry et al., 2010). Video recording is a valuable tool for study of 
learning as social practices because, by contrast to field notes and other ethnographic 
materials, video recordings allow study of events in the detail of their actual 
production (Jordan & Henderson, 1995). In addition, gazes, facial expressions, bodily 
performances, and their relations to the material features of the environment can be 
examined in great detail.  
As a general guideline, all video recordings were intended to capture social 
interactions rather than individual actions or isolated features of the environment, 
such as a computer screen or an artifact during the students’ experimentations. When 
possible, a main camera was used to record the main interactions between people and 
artifacts, and a second camera was used to capture either closer details or aspects of 
the larger context (such as an illustration projected on a wall) without losing the main 
interaction. Because the curricular activities involved several digital surfaces, to 
avoid missing important data while attempting to capture the details of the students’ 
references to these surfaces, we used video recording software to capture the events 
taking place in the digital screens during activities in which these were particularly 
relevant. To ensure an appropriate-quality sound without interfering in the natural 
organization of the classroom and the museum activities, sound was captured by 
several microphones, including camera-mounted microphones, flat microphones 
positioned on tables or adhered to walls in the classroom and the museum space, and 
lapel microphones clipped onto the clothes of some participants, such as the teacher 
or particular students during activities in which the students moved throughout the 
museum space.  
In addition, we conducted ethnographic observations that we documented in field 
notes and photographs. Field notes allowed us to record initial assertions about the 
social and learning processes taking place that could later be tested and developed 
with regard to the entire database. Photographs were used to document the settings 
and activities in high detail and allowed us to digitize all of the participants’ produced 
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and/or utilized artifacts and documents. Finally, semi-structured interviews with the 
teacher and the students were conducted before and after each of the iteration 
implementations. The semi-structured interviews included two main parts. First, 
personal experience and interests regarding school life, technology, and science and 
science museums were discussed. During the interviews, specific episodes that took 
place during the curriculum implementation and were of particular relevance to the 
researchers and/or to the participants were also discussed. The second part of the 
interviews consisted of a discussion about the conceptual domain of energy and of 
how particular aspects had been topicalized during the curricular activities. During 
this part, and in line with research showing the tool-mediated and formative nature of 
interview situations (e.g., Schoultz, Säljö, & Wyndhamn, 2001), artifacts and 
documents that were produced during the curricular activities and/or extracted from 
the students’ textbooks were used as material resources for anchoring and motivating 
the discussion. 
Analytical procedures and approach 
In this section, I describe the analytical procedures that have led to the selection and 
analysis of the case studies included in this thesis. Each of the three articles included 
in this thesis constitutes a case study selected from each of the three iterations 
described above. A case study is a type of inquiry that “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Thus, case 
studies allow for producing the kind of intimate understandings of situated activity 
that the transactional framework developed in Chapter 3 demands. 
In the following, I first discuss the relation between my interest in analyzing 
conceptual coherence as an endogenous social organization of the participants on the 
one hand, and the pedagogical interests that derive from being part of a larger design-
based research project on the other. Within that context, I introduce the notion of 
bracketing, which describes the practice by means of which researchers put aside 
preconceived categories that respond to their own natural inclinations or professional 
interests and, instead of using them to explain particular instances of conduct, focus 
on how the participants produce the resources necessary for recognizing those 
categories as observable facts of social interaction. In two following sections, I 
describe the procedures that led me to select particular instances of social interaction 
and the analytical approach by means of which I examined their moment-by-moment 
production. 
Design-based research, bracketing, and analyses of social interaction 
As part of MIRACLE’s design-based research agenda, an orientation towards issues 
of conceptual coherence and continuity preceded my first approaches to the data 
corpus. However, in line with a cultural-historical approach that takes interest in 
design interventions as mediational tools (Krange & Ludvigsen, 2009), I have made 
important efforts not to bring preconceived ideas about coherence and continuity to 
bear on my analytical work. In this regard, and as ethnomethodologically informed 
approaches to video analysis in design-based research recommend (e.g., Koschmann, 
Stahl, & Zemel, 2007), I have kept a division of labor between the analytical 
accounts of social interaction on the one hand, and an acculturated interest of what is 
educationally important to study in a design-based project on the other. The latter 
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interest guides the identification of the kinds of social phenomena that become the 
focus of the analyses. However, to address the emergent and material aspects of 
interaction that are the object of my research questions, further accounts of the 
participants’ endogenous coordination work that makes such social phenomena 
recognizable categories of analysis must follow. This procedure is captured by the 
notion of bracketing, which originates in Husserl’s phenomenology, and which has 
been taken up in sociology (Schutz, 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1986) and, more 
recently, also in educational research (Koschmann et al., 2007; Roth, 2013b). 
Bracketing involves a researcher putting aside her own natural or professional 
inclinations to categorize particular instances of activity, and, rather than uncritically 
accepting those categories as explanative forces, retracing the history of their 
emergence as observable social facts. In this regard, the notion of bracketing directs 
attention to “the actual labor and living work” (Roth, 2013b, p. 15) that comes to 
constitute phenomena as the recognizable social facts that we, as researchers, come to 
categorize by means of formal analyses. 
Importantly, bracketing does not imply a negation of the value of formal analyses and 
of the resulting categories by means of which may gloss courses of action of 
particular interest. Thus, the researcher does not reject her culturally competent 
recognition of a particular episode of activity as being an instance of, e.g., transfer. 
On the contrary, she “continues to accept what is being bracketed” (Roth, 2013b, p. 
12). Once having bracketed a particular aspect or conception about a social event, 
however, “the researcher focuses on how this or that aspect of the world … becomes 
a phenomenon such that her natural attitude or natural concepts include and index it” 
(p. 12, original emphasis). This implies providing a detailed account of how 
recognizable social achievements such as successfully transferring something learned 
in one setting into another (which I explore in Study I), or drawing a conceptual 
connection between a hands-on experiment and a digital simulation of a heat pump 
(which I explore in Study II), are produced as observable, accountable facts in and 
through the participants’ situated interactions. In this way, the researcher provides an 
intimate and detailed understanding of the endogenous practices by means of which 
participants make us of and appropriate the designed (technical, cultural, 
pedagogical) tools and can use this knowledge to further inform design (Dourish & 
Button, 1998; Suchman, 1995). 
In line with the perspective sketched above, and following practices described by 
interaction analysis (Jordan & Henderson, 1995) and more recent guidelines on video 
research in the learning sciences (Derry et al., 2010), I have followed a two-step 
procedure. First, I have used video recordings of interaction and other ethnographic 
materials to identify particular episodes of activity or discursive patterns of interest to 
the questions of conceptual coherence and continuity—events in Jordan and 
Henderson’s terminology. Once particular events or a class of events were identified, 
I have performed detailed microgenetic analyses to account for the endogenous 
constitution of those episodes or practices. In the following sections, I describe both 
moments of the analytical practice. 
Selecting the cases 
To identify particular events (or classes of events) relevant to the problems of 
conceptual coherence and continuity, I followed a whole-to-part inductive procedure, 
as described by Jordan and Henderson (1995) and Derry et al. (2010). This involves 
 Research Setting and Methods 51 
 
drawing from (a) ethnographic materials recorded during the field work and (b) 
repeated viewings of the corpus of video recordings, to achieve a framing context and 
to identify “interactional ‘hot spots’” (Jordan & Henderson, 1995, p. 43), namely, 
“sites of activity for which videotaping promises to be productive” (p. 43). This 
context then serves as background for the microanalyses of interaction (part), which, 
in turn, come to inform the general ethnographic whole. 
To facilitate this process, I digitized all collected materials and created a catalogued 
database using Nvivo 9 (Iteration 1) and Transana software (Iterations 2 and 3). All 
video recordings were transcribed, and the transcripts were added to the catalogue 
along with the video recordings. Transcribing and cataloguing the database allowed 
me to gain a very intimate contact with the materials, and many initial assertions 
about events of interest emerged during this process. In addition, design-related 
interests in particular aspects of the curricula and insights gained through the 
ethnographic observations gathered during the fieldwork also guided my first 
annotations about the materials. Using the notational facilities in the Transana 
software, I created a set of assertions and hypotheses about particular events of 
interest and a corresponding set of video clips that supported the generation of such 
assertions. I then began to test the assertions in the rest of the materials. Thus, in 
Study III, for example, I identified particular recursive questioning practices, as part 
of the teachers’ methods during summary plenary sessions. I tested the adequacy of 
this finding by systematically searching for similar patterns in the entire database of 
plenary sessions. In Study I, I complemented the analyses of video recordings with 
analysis of field notes and recordings of the pre- and post-interviews to provide 
consistent evidence that a group of students had successfully made use of a particular 
scientific law in a number of different activities and settings. 
In addition to the repeated viewings and the ethnographic contextualization of the 
materials, I made use of my multidisciplinary collaborative network, both within the 
MIRACLE project and through the InterMedia research group at the University of 
Oslo, and arranged several data sessions in which I presented selected excerpts for 
collective analysis. In these sessions, I could test my own hypotheses against other 
researchers’ observations and hypotheses. Importantly, not only researchers familiar 
with the setting, but also professionals and other PhD students participated in these 
sessions, including professors and students at the LinCS institute at the University of 
Gothenburg, educators at the French Institute of Education in Lyon, and an 
international group of students working with professor Roth at the University of 
Brisbane, Australia. Once I selected specific events or sets of events of interest, I 
proceeded to prepare corresponding video clips for detailed microgenetic analyses. 
To conduct a most detailed transcription of interaction, including gestural and 
prosodic aspects of communication, I exported the clips to ELAN, a program for 
linguistic analysis that enables annotating and visualizing multiple layers of 
interaction, such as lapses, overlapping talk, and gestures, in a time-line axis. In 
addition, I used PRAAT, a tool developed for the analysis of phonetics, to perform 
detailed analyses of pitch and other prosodic aspects of talk. 
Microgenetic analyses of interaction 
In line with the analytical framework described in Chapter 3, the purpose of the 
microgenetic analyses is to investigate coherence and continuity achievements as 
transactional phenomena. Accordingly, the analyses of the selected episodes of 
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interaction must capture persons and settings as they develop over time in mutual 
relation. It is in this sense that I refer to them as microgenetic. This involves taking 
the endogenous first-time-through perspective of the participants, who are implicated 
in the production and understanding of the events under analysis. To that aim, and in 
line with interaction analysis practices (Jordan & Henderson, 1995), and with the 
conversation analysis tradition that informs them (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
1974), I have taken the organization of turn-taking as the most fundamental 
constitutive phenomenon of social order. Here I use the notions interaction and 
conversation indistinctly to include what Psathas (1995) refers to as talk-in-
interaction, and which Jordan and Henderson (1995) describe as “encompassing the 
whole range of behaviors through which people can ‘take a turn’” (Jordan & 
Henderson, 1995, p. 64), which may involve not only talk, but also “‘turns with 
bodies’ and ‘turns with artifacts’” (p. 64).  
The idea that the social organization of conversation is primary in the constitution of 
cognitive life underlies the philosophies of influential dialogical thinkers, including 
Vygotsky, Wittgenstein, and Bakhtin (Shotter, 1993; Wertsch, 1991). The 
organization of turn-taking always involves at least two participants. Therefore, it 
always implies a social relation as an irreducible unit of analysis. Accordingly, and 
consistent with the transactional framework elaborated in Chapter 3, any single 
utterance or action performed during social interaction is to be analyzed with regard 
to the interactional whole of which it forms part. A minimal unit of analysis always 
involves at least two turns. Taking two turns as the minimal unit of analysis allows 
for adopting the participants’ shop floor perspective, where relations of significations 
and the function of particular tools can be inspected in their becoming significant in 
and through situated action.  
To investigate how the functions of signs and tools emerge as developmental and 
unforeseeable aspects of lived-in activity (i.e., experience), I have examined the 
organization of turn-taking at three different but mutually constitutive levels of 
analysis. These three levels are three different time-scales (Lemke, 2000) in which 
the same unitary process of microgenesis is assumed to take place. That is, the three 
levels are elaborations of the internal forces that constitute the unit of transaction 
depicted in Figure 3A. 
The first level is that of structuring (Roth & Bowen, 2001), which involves at least 
two turns, the initiation of an action and its reception. It is at this level that structures 
in a situation emerge as salient elements of activity in the first place. It is in being 
perceived and responded to by others as acts of signification that individual actions 
emerge as meaningful means-consequence relations of activity (Dewey, 1938). As in 
Vygotsky’s illustration, an individual’s gesture acquires its intentional sense in and 
through its being responded to by others rather than by virtue of its production alone. 
Examining this level brings attention to the transition from immediate experience and 
action-related engagement to culturally mediated experience. A second level of 
analysis is that of grounding (Roth & Bowen, 2001), which involves those larger, yet 
unitary stretches of interaction in which emerging structures come to be related, by 
means of yet other gestures or language signs, to accountable ways of talking about 
the world (discursive practices). It is at this level that relations of signification 
emerge between concrete actions during, for example, science learning activities and 
scientific-like ways of talking. Finally, at a third level of analysis, I have examined 
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how practices involved in structuring and grounding come to produce a larger context 
of relevance )&(*%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Research credibility and ethical considerations 
In this section, I discuss issues of research credibility and ethical considerations. 
Research credibility concerns the question of whether findings reported in an 
investigation are “confirmable, valid, and reliable” (Denzin, 2009). In the following, I 
discuss how my analytical and data presentation procedures deal with possible threats 
to reliability, validity, and generalization.  
Reliability 
The notion of reliability, most commonly used in quantitative paradigms to refer to 
how consistent a measuring instrument is across time, relates to the notion of 
construct validity, that is, how well a measurement captures the phenomena it is 
designed to capture. In much qualitative research, however, where the goal is not 
measurement but rather “generating understanding” (Stenbacka, 2001, p. 551), 
alternative notions, such as that of dependability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) or 
descriptive validity (Maxwell, 1992), have been developed. In qualitative research in 
general, increasing the reliability of an study involves describing the methods by 
means of which “fidelity to real life, context- and situation-specificity, 
comprehensiveness, detail, honesty” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2007, p. 149) has 
been granted through the research process. 
A first important aspect that has implications for reliability in my research has been 
the use of audiovisual recordings as the main data source. Video has qualities that 
strengthen reliability because it records social activities in real time, as they actually 
happen (Heath, Hindmarsh, & Luff, 2010; Jordan & Henderson, 1995). Moreover, 
video preserves the original record for further scrutiny, and a particular segment of 
video can be played over and over again so that “questions of what is actually on the 
tape versus what observers think they saw can be resolved by recourse to the tape as 
the final authority” (Jordan & Henderson, 1995, p. 45). 
Throughout my treatment of the video materials, I have engaged in several practices 
that strengthen the reliability of my accounts. First, in inspecting and transcribing the 
video materials, I have relied on specific software designed for transcription and 
annotation of video, which allows for systematic and repeated viewing and 
annotation, as well as for modification of several parameters that facilitate detailed 
inspection, such as the playing pace or the sound quality. Second, collective data 
sessions have given me further opportunities not just to contrast hypotheses about 
social phenomena as such, but also to secure agreement about observations of 
precisely what the participants were doing or saying. Third, in transcribing and 
presenting my data, and consistent with an interest in embodied interaction, I have 
relied on standardized Jeffersonian notation conventions (Appendix 1), which allows 
for including great detail with regard not only to talk but also to gestures and 
prosodic aspects of talk, and which make it possible for anyone familiar with these 
conventions to inspect the accuracy of my descriptions. In addition, and related to 
this last point, I have made significant efforts to furnish my transcriptions with visual 
presentations of the materials, such as gestures and body positionings, which were 
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important to my accounts. In doing so, I have relied on specific software (as 
described in Studies I and III) and techniques to present the events as accurately as 
possible with respect to the original video footage. 
Validity 
Validity refers to the question of “how accurately the account represents participants’ 
realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them” (Creswell & Miller, 2000). 
It is a question of how researchers draw inferences connecting their accounts and the 
phenomena their accounts are claimed to be about (Maxwell, 1992). In this regard, it 
is important that the researchers provide a careful and transparent account of “the 
ascent from the data source to the claim establishing a tight chain of argument” (Roth 
& Hsu, 2010, p. 142). To that aim, both throughout my empirical studies and 
throughout this dissertation, I have made significant efforts to keep my analytical 
assumptions visible with regard to the choice of methods and data sources, and to 
discuss how they relate to different premises in other empirical studies. Throughout 
extended analyses of moment-by-moment interaction, I have made my argumentative 
moves between the transcribed materials and the analytical accounts transparent. 
This, and the use of detailed conventional transcription, makes the move among 
premises, data, and account traceable and repeatable by others, making it possible for 
the reader to check the validity of my claims. 
An important issue when analyzing social interaction involves providing guarantees 
that an emic rather than an etic perspective is being achieved (Maxwell, 1992). That 
is, that the participants’ perspective is being accounted for adequately. In this regard, 
the interaction analysis framework from which my analyses have drawn, described in 
the previous section, provides several resources. First, the next-turn proof procedure, 
implied by the two-turns minimal unit of analysis described above, involves 
analyzing the particular sense, meaning, or intention of any single utterance by 
reference to how it is taken up and followed up by the producer and her co-
participants through extended interaction. In this regard, I have avoided using 
categories external to the participants’ own ways of elaborating their own situation to 
and for each other. Second, in taking a first-time-through perspective, I have avoided 
reading interaction backwards, namely, taking something said or done by the 
participants later as a resource to explain something said or done before, and have 
performed a forward reading, as discussed in the analytical approach section and in 
Chapter 3. Finally, I have revised my own readings of the sequentiality and 
consequential relevance exhibited by the participants by testing my observations in 
collective data sessions. 
In addition to the points made above, granting the credibility of a study involves 
showing that “the claims are supported across the different forms of data sources” 
(Roth & Hsu, 2010, p. 142). In this regard, when claims about social interaction have 
concerned the identification of recurrent patterns or categorical observations—such 
as cataloguing an episode as one of “successful transfer”—I have established the 
frequency of the phenomenon, and have tested the hypotheses in multiple data 
sources, including documents generated by the participants, video recordings of the 
students’ curricular activities, and video recordings of the pre- and post-interviews. 
This latter aspect has most directly contributed to supporting the generalizability of 
the findings, a topic that I address in the following section. 
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Generalizability 
In broad terms, the issue of generalizability refers to “the extent to which one can 
extend the account of a particular situation or population to other persons, times, or 
settings than those directly studied” (Maxwell, 1992, p. 293). Because case studies 
focus on the context-bound detail of single cases rather than on the relative 
frequencies across multiple cases, the generalizability of the claims resulting from 
such studies has been a debated issue in the literature (e.g., Campbell, 1975; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Yet, whereas case studies do not represent 
adequate “samples” of given populations—as is required in the statistical 
generalization—case studies can lead to analytical generalizations (Yin, 2009). That 
is, case studies are “generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations” 
(p. 15).  
Analytical generalizations imply approaching cases as particulars of the general. As 
Bourdieu (1992) poses it, “to construct a scientific object also demands that you take 
up an active and systematic posture vis-à-vis ‘facts’… [it requires] that you tackle 
every concrete empirical case with the purpose of building a model (Bourdieu, 1992, 
p. 233, original emphasis). From this view, concrete cases of social interaction should 
be considered “particular instance[s] of the possible” (p. 233) and culture in general 
“constitute[s] generalized possibilities but [is] available only through the ways in 
which [it] is actually realized” (Ercikan & Roth, 2006, p. 14). Accordingly, I have 
approached the analyses of concrete cases with the aim of building models that 
describe general ways in which teachers and students generate conceptual 
connections between events within and across situations. On the one hand, I have 
elaborated how the detailed descriptions of the “hesitant and momentary contexts” 
(McDermott, Gospodinoff, & Aron, 1978, p. 246) that teachers and students 
exhibited to each other to organize joint activity could be seen as the realization of 
general cultural possibilities related to the achievement of conceptual coherence in 
and across science learning situations. On the other hand, in providing intimate 
knowledge of specific cases, the studies have contributed to a growing body of 
empirical research that provides other researchers with the type of “context-
dependent knowledge and experience [that] are the very heart of expert activity” 
(Flybvjerg, 2006, p. 222).  
Ethical considerations 
Video-based ethnographic research poses a number of challenges that we as 
researchers must deal with to grant ethically sound practice. In compliance with 
national guidelines, an appropriate notification request was sent to and subsequently 
approved by the Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services (NSD).  Following 
national and international guidelines, the researchers in the MIRACLE project as a 
collective agreed upon several measures to guarantee the potential participants’ 
freedom to decide their participation without pressure, and to inform them about their 
right not to participate. Because teachers and students do not have the same 
institutional roles in schooling, and because their participation in the study differed in 
that the teachers were also involved as part of the curriculum design, we created 
different information letters for “teacher participants” and for “student participants.” 
In the letters, we provided information about who the researchers and partners 
involved in the MIRACLE project were, what our purposes were, what their 
participation would consist of, and the kind of data that we were going to collect. In 
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the letter, their right to not participate and their right to withdraw from participation 
at any time were emphasized. To make sure that the content of the letter was properly 
communicated to the students, and to reduce pressure or a sense of obligation, a 
researcher—and not the teacher—elaborated on all the aspects of the letter orally in 
the classroom. All researchers involved were present and introduced themselves to 
the students and teachers.  
Important ethical aspects concerned maintaining the participants’ anonymity and 
storing sensitive data. In this regard, the potential participants were given the choice 
to mark two options. One granted the researchers the right to use the data obtained 
during the study for research purposes; the other gave them the right to also use 
visual or audio material in “illustrations, journal articles, talks, and presentations on 
the web as well as in other media related to dissemination of the project’s results” 
(quoted from the consent letter, my translation from the original Norwegian). 
Throughout all publications, all participants have been given pseudonyms. Although 
the project did not collect any sensitive personal information—information about 
race or ethnic background; political, philosophical or religious opinion; health 
condition; sexual orientation” or membership in associations—the data collected in 
the MIRACLE project is sensitive in many respects. First, in video recordings, 
individuals can be directly identified by their unique personal characteristics, and 
their identity further traced back as it may become disclosed during interaction. In 
addition, because our ethnographic observations were most often conducted not in 
experimental conditions, but in their natural school and out-of-school settings, 
participants were recorded as they spontaneously performed during their everyday 
conduct, thus often spontaneously disclosing private aspects that may involve 
sensitive information. All data were stored in a secured server at the University of 
Oslo to ensure proper care. Only researchers with the proper credentials can access 
the server, and access is secured by an individual password for each researcher. Only 
one of the researchers (myself), in addition to one of the technical stuff that maintains 
the server, was given the right to modify any entry in the database, to guarantee the 
originality and integrity of the materials. 
Chapter 5: Summary of the 
Studies and Discussion 
In this chapter, I summarize the findings from the three studies that form part of this 
thesis and discuss their empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions to the 
fields of research on conceptual coherence and continuity in general, and of inquiry-
based science education in particular.  
I began this thesis with an episode of learning in which a young child was drawing a 
face for the first time. In discussing the episode, I drew attention to its emergent and 
unexpected character, where an affective element of surprise seemed to perfuse the 
learning event and contribute to its development. Through my observations of K–12 
students’ engagement in MIRACLE’s inquiry activities, I have observed similar 
instances in which the students were surprised by the outcomes of their own actions. 
In these situations, the students were not unlike the young child in the opening 
vignette, who could not aim at doing something that she did not know she could do. 
By engaging in the inquiry activities, the K–12 students found themselves in the 
midst of new and unexpected situations that their own actions had brought them into 
without yet being capable of articulating in any formal terms what these situations 
were about. Yet, it was by virtue of being immersed in such unexpected situations 
that new ways of accounting for the situations emerged. In such situations, therefore, 
the conditions for growing intellectually appeared to be already present in the 
material situations that the learners themselves had jointly produced. 
Each of the three studies included in this thesis represents an attempt to understand 
the relation between the individual learners and the developmental situations within 
which they find themselves when conceptual coherence and continuity are outcomes 
of activity. Each study addresses the problematic in the context of a larger field of 
inquiry. Study I addresses the problem in the context of research on transfer, Study II 
is most relevant to the field of learning with multiple representations, and Study III 
looks at the achievement of coherence and continuity in the context of classroom talk 
studies. In the following, I first briefly summarize the context, goal, and conclusions 
of the three studies. In a subsequent section, I describe their empirical, theoretical, 
and methodological contributions in more detail. 
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Summary of the studies 
Study I 
Jornet, A., Roth, W.-M., & Krange, I. (submitted). A transactional approach to 
transfer episodes. Journal of the Learning Sciences. 
Although this study was not the first chronologically, I include it first because it 
articulates some of the most fundamental conceptual and analytical grounds on which 
all three studies rest. In the study, we draw from Vygotsky, Dewey, and 
contemporary phenomenology (e.g., Romano, 2009; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011) to 
elaborate the transactional analytical framework that has informed this thesis, paying 
particular attention to the notion of (an) experience as an analytical category. In the 
study, we discuss the framework as an analytical tool for approaching episodes of 
successful transfer during classroom activities—episodes in which the participants 
declare or can be declared to bring prior experience to bear on the current 
organization of (school) activity. Central to the analytical framework is the premise 
that, in bringing prior experience to bear on current activity, it is not that some known 
thing is carried over, but that the whole person-in-setting is transformed. 
Accordingly, the relevant moments of activity need to be accounted for by categories 
that retain such transformation, by means of process categories.  
Drawing from video recordings of the curricular activities, ethnographic materials 
documenting the teacher’s evaluations of the students, and video recordings of the 
post-test interviews, we identify a case of transfer in which a group of students 
identify (a) a hands-on experiment and (b) a set of digital simulations as instances of 
(c) a scientific law relating pressure, temperature, and energy. We then provide 
detailed analyses of the moment-by-moment interactions that take place as the 
students draw conceptual connections between these different aspects of the 
curriculum (hands-on experiment, digital simulation, and scientific law) for the first 
time. The analyses reveal how cognitive processes that are considered central in the 
transfer literature and that often are invoked to account for aspects of individual 
classroom activity, namely recognition, analogical inference, and applying 
theoretical knowledge, take place as bodily achievements that extend in time and 
across participants. The analyses show that drawing conceptual connections between 
different aspects of the material setting and across different curricular activities 
involves perceiving similarities as much as it does being uncertain about how the 
perceived similarities may be articulated in conceptual (i.e., linguistic) terms. Thus, 
categories that describe the stretches of activity during which conceptual connections 
are elaborated and stabilized in terms of synchronic cognitive processes—i.e., 
recognizing, inferring, applying knowledge—do not capture such uncertainty and its 
role as part of the process. Rather, to account for how such uncertainty is resolved 
through extended inquiry, a detailed description of the organization of talk and 
gesture in the course of the episode is required. We provide such specification for 
each of the three cognitive processes mentioned above and discuss the findings with 
regard to other research that also takes a sociocultural and situative stance. 
Study II 
Jornet, A., & Roth, W.-M. (in press). The joint work of connecting multiple 
(re)presentations in science classrooms. Science Education. 
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Study II addresses the question of emergence of conceptual coherence as it relates to 
the use of multiple representations during guided inquiry and during teacher-led 
summary lessons. Representations, also referred to as inscriptions, are central to 
scientific practice (e.g., Knorr-Cetina & Amann, 1990; Latour, 1987) and an 
important element in science learning and teaching (e.g., Kozma & Russell, 1997; 
Roth & McGinn, 1998). With the increasing adoption of computerized means to 
visualize scientific content in inquiry-based curricula, educators and researchers have 
explored multimedia teaching practices directed to foster the competence of relating 
and coordinating multiple representations with each other and with the phenomena 
they stand for (e.g., Ainsworth, 2008; van der Meij & deJong, 2011).  
A more-or-less tacit assumption in much of the literature about learning with multiple 
representations is that representations encode information and that learning from 
those representations involves a mental process of decoding. Thus, it is often argued, 
“only when learners identify these references within and between the external 
representations can they construct a coherent mental representation and come to a 
deeper understanding of the subject matter” (van der Meij & de Jong, 2006, p. 321). 
However, an increasing number of studies have begun to investigate learning with 
multiple representations as a social semiotic process (for a review, see Waldrip et al., 
2010). The study aims to expand research from these emerging perspectives by 
providing empirical and analytical accounts of the social and semiotic processes that 
are involved in drawing conceptual connections between teaching materials and 
across situations. 
In this study, we elaborate on a cultural-historical approach to semiotic mediation to 
investigate the transactional processes by means of which students and teachers 
jointly come to draw connections of signification between the different teaching 
materials (i.e., a set of hands-on experiments and a set of digital visualizations) and 
the scientific contents that are the object of the curriculum through both inquiry-
based and teacher-led summary sessions. From this perspective, the relations between 
any two materials are the result of practical work. Accordingly, we trace in our 
analysis the emergence of students’ interpretations of the relations between 
phenomena and their diverse presentations without committing to any preconceived 
notion of what these presentations stand for. Our analyses reveal the practical work 
by means of which presentations—a physical experiment, a digital simulation—come 
to be treated as representing something other than themselves in and through the joint 
inquiry activities that teacher and students perform. We provide detailed analyses of 
the coordination work by means of which material aspects of the setting (i.e., the 
artifacts in a hands-on experiment, the digital simulations) move from being aspects 
of immediate experience to being mediational means constitutive of science teaching 
and learning practices. In this, the role of bodily engagement in actual praxis emerges 
as a constitutive moment in the process of mediation. We conclude the article by 
discussing how these findings are in line with, but also expand, research from other 
sociocultural and situative studies that also highlight the role of representations as 
semiotic resources (e.g., Furberg et al., 2013). 
Study III 
Jornet, A. (submitted). Bodily performances of coherence facilitation: The role of the 
body during teacher questioning in science classrooms. Journal of Research 
in Science Teaching. 
 Extended Abstract  
 
60 
The aim of the third study included in this thesis was to investigate how teachers’ 
bodily performances are involved in the constitution of coherent question-answer 
sequences during teacher-led summary sessions in the classroom. The study was 
initially motivated by (a) an interest in examining in more detail how conceptual 
relations of coherence and continuity are elaborated during teacher-led summary 
plenum sessions, and (b) an interest in the role of bodily engagement—which became 
salient in Studies I and II—in establishing such relations. Early during the 
preliminary analyses of the teacher-led summary lessons, the role of teacher-initiated 
questions in organizing classroom interaction became very salient. Through closer 
analysis of the entire set of teacher-led summary sessions in the database, the 
interdependence among (a) talk, (b) bodily performance, and (c) the emergence of 
conceptual relations of coherence became salient. The study investigates the 
intersection of these three aspects. 
Teacher questioning, and in particular sequences where the teacher initiates a 
question, the students reply, and the teacher subsequently evaluates (IRE) or follows 
up (IRF), have been recognized as a resource for facilitating that connections between 
everyday experiences and scientific ways of talking emerge in the classroom (e.g., 
Mehan, 1979; Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Wells, 1993). The role of bodily 
performances (i.e., gestures) in the development of scientific literacy has received 
increasing attention during recent years (e.g., Alibali & Nathan, 2007; Roth, 2000; 
Novack et al., 2014). However, research has not yet addressed the intersection of 
these two aspects in bringing forth conceptual discourse during science classroom 
interactions.  
In Study III, I examine teacher-initiated IRE/F question-answer sequences during a 
set of sessions in which videos that had been recorded by the students during inquiry 
activities were retrieved and displayed in plenum and discussed. The analyses detail 
how a teacher’s bodily performances provide material resources for displaying topic 
coherence and continuity during question-answer sequences despite the students’ 
initial lack of conceptual understanding of the curriculum. Through bodily 
performances, the participants produce a framework of reference or substrate that 
becomes an important resource for drawing conceptual connections. It is argued that 
achieving relations of conceptual coherence and continuity through IRE/F sequences 
involves an education of attention (Ingold, 2001) to material, concrete aspects of the 
immediate environment, which could then be indexed to the classroom’s immediate 
history of referential performance. 
Discussion of findings and contributions 
In this section, I detail the analytical and empirical findings of the three studies and 
discuss how these contribute to the fields of learning science and science education. 
First, I discuss the theoretical and analytical contributions that derive from our 
elaborations on the connections between Vygotsky’s notions of perezhivanie and unit 
analysis and Dewey’s notions of experience and transaction. While in chapter 3 I use 
the metaphor of a black box to refer to the practice of stopping specifying the detail 
of joint interaction to account for social phenomena, in a second subsection I describe 
how the empirical studies, in specifying the detail of moment-by-moment social 
transactions, contribute to an understanding of the microgenesis of mediational 
processes, that is, of the transition between immediate and mediated action. In doing 
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so, attention is focused on the relation between bodily and performative aspects of 
activity and the constitution of conceptual coherence. In a third and final subsection, I 
discuss the methodological contributions. 
Exploring new productive connections between Dewey and Vygotsky 
Dewey and Vygotsky are two of the most influential and often-cited scholars in 
research literature about learning and education. As discussed in chapter 3, 
similarities and complementarities between the two scholars have been the topic of 
considerable literature during the years (e.g., Garrison, 2001; Miettinen, 2001). 
Although Dewey’s ideas are often invoked in science education literature, few 
researchers indeed provide elaborated analytical tools as a result (cf. Wong et al., 
2001). Similarly, whereas the importance of Vygotsky’s ideas about perezhivanie has 
been highlighted as a potential asset in developmental (e.g., Rey, 2011; Smagorinsky, 
2011) and clinical (e.g., Vasilyuk, 1991) psychology, its adoption as an analytical 
resource in science education has been much more modest (cf. Fleer, 2011). 
Exploring further connections between Dewey and Vygotsky as a potential means to 
improve our understanding of processes of development and transformation in 
activity in general (Miettinen, 2006), and in science education in particular 
(Stetsenko, 2008). 
In two of the empirical studies conducted during my doctoral scholarship, including 
Study I (Roth & Jornet, 2014; Jornet et al., submitted), my supervisors and I have 
elaborated conceptual connections between Vygotsky’s cultural-historical and 
Dewey’s pragmatist frameworks, which have led us to the development of analytical 
tools for the study of concrete episodes of learning and development. Although 
informed by previous treatments, the resulting framework presents novel aspects that 
contribute to the general goals of (a) further exploring productive connections 
between Dewey and Vygotsky to inform research on learning and cognition (e.g., 
Miettinen, 2001; Stetsenko, 2008) and (b) expanding the analytical technologies for 
studying learning as situated social achievements (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; 
Lave, 1988).  
First, we expand prior characterizations of the connections between the two authors 
by exploring both dialectical and phenomenological aspects in their respective 
approaches to the relation between situations and subjects, and to the experience as a 
category of analysis. Many of the commonalities that we discuss regarding 
Vygotsky’s and Dewey’s works can be traced back to a common interest in Hegelian 
dialectics, which other researchers have also explored in great depth (e.g., Miettinen, 
2006). In addition, however, we acknowledge phenomenological aspects underlying 
both researchers’ conceptualizations. These phenomenological aspects are less often 
discussed in the literature with regard to Dewey (e.g., Løvlie, 2014) or Vygotsky 
(Macdonald, 2000; Roth, 2011). Yet, they allow us to read the works of these two 
important scholars in the context of more recent developments in continental 
philosophy, where scholars have developed accounts of experience as a unity of 
intellect, praxis, and emotion that most fundamentally involves movement and 
change (Romano, 2009; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011). These aspects also make it possible 
to draw further connections with phenomenological and pragmatist incursions into 
dialogical thinking, such as those elaborated by Bakhtin in Towards a philosophy of 
the act (Bakhtin, 1993). We discuss such connections in Roth and Jornet (2014). 
Most importantly, and as discussed in chapter 4, attention to these aspects allows for 
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elaborating, analytically and empirically, the subject as a moment in the irreducible 
subject-environment dialectical relation, a challenge that sociocultural and situative 
frameworks have been called to address in the recent literature (Packer, 2001; Silseth 
& Arnseth, 2011; Stetsenko, 2005). 
Second, our discussion does not remain in a theoretical plane alone but is grounded in 
empirical materials and leads to specific analytical tools to address analyses of 
situated transaction. Connections between Dewey and Vygotsky have most often 
been drawn at the theoretical level. Less often, these connections are elaborated in 
their application as analytical technologies and by reference to concrete empirical 
materials. Both in the empirical studies and throughout this thesis, I make efforts to 
elaborate on how the theoretical discussion leads to analytical tools for approaching 
learning and development in situated action and to ground the discussion in concrete 
empirical materials. Important in this regard has been not to lose sight of an 
overarching cultural-historical methodological framework, grounded in a unit 
analysis approach and a focus on tool-mediated activity. Also important, as discussed 
in more detail below, has been the drawing from affinities with 
ethnomethodologically informed techniques of interaction analysis. With regard to 
this last point, the contributions of my work can be seen as an analytical and 
empirical expansion of work advanced by Roth in science education during recent 
years (e.g., Roth 2011, 2013). In this, precisely the incorporation of Dewey’s ideas 
about experience and transaction, and a focus on conceptual coherence and 
continuity, can be seen as important novel elements of that expansion. 
Opening the black box: Microgenesis of mediation in science inquiry 
One of the most important implications of the analytical framework elaborated 
throughout this thesis is that it allows us to address aspects of the inherently social, 
joint work involved in establishing conceptual coherence and continuity that 
otherwise remain unaddressed. As discussed in previous chapters, in analyzing social 
interaction, irrespective of the theoretical perspective, research tends to focus on 
language and the linguistic aspects of talk as the primary means of social relation. 
Throughout this thesis, I acknowledge the important contributions that such studies 
provide. Describing social practices by means of categories that allude to linguistic 
aspects of interaction, such as discursive practices in Lobato et al.’s study discussed 
in chapter 2, is an important task that answers many of the questions relevant to an 
ecological approach to learning and cognition. Yet, in focusing on linguistic and 
symbolic aspects of interaction as the primary cultural tools involved in intellectual 
development, these studies also leave unaddressed non-linguistic, performative 
aspects of social interaction that otherwise are central to the everyday (cultural) life in 
which linguistic and symbolic forms are mobilized. To achieve an account of how 
cultural mediation relates to the fullness of life in which participants are implicated 
during everyday activity, accounts of how mediation grows out of “organic activity” 
(Dewey, 1938, p. 19) are also required.  
An important contribution of this thesis concerns its attention to the processes by 
means of which immediate aspects of the material environment come to form part of 
mediational processes in and through the concrete practices by means of which they 
become mobilized during activity. Specifying the relation between immediate and 
mediated action is important because, as British psychologist A. Costall (2007) 
argues, 
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if we are going to make sense of mediation, how it originates and is 
sustained, we will need to find a place in our theories for the existence of 
both meaning and mediation before and beyond the realm of representations 
and symbols, and take their materiality much more seriously. (p. 120) 
An approach that investigates how shifts from immediate to mediated activity take 
place is consistent with Vygotsky’s method of double stimulation, where the aim is to 
observe how a neutral stimulus comes to acquire a semiotic function as an auxiliary 
means during problem-solving activities (Vygotsky, 1978, 2012). The notion of 
double stimulation has been applied in studies of organizational development (e.g., 
Cole & Engeström, 2007) and in computer-supported collaborative learning (e.g., 
Lund & Rasmussen, 2008). However, in these studies, accounts of the transitions 
from immediate to mediated activity have been given with regard to the collective 
level, and, when analyzing situated action, the focus has been on the linguistic and 
symbolic aspects. Thus, further research is required to provide microgenetic accounts 
of how individual actors come to be constituted and constitutive moments of 
mediational processes, and of how performative, yet-to-become-symbolic aspects of 
interaction may be involved. 
The empirical studies conducted as part of this thesis contribute to a better 
understanding of the microgenetic processes by means of which diverse teaching 
materials and artifacts become cultural means that mediate the achievement of 
conceptual coherence and continuity during science inquiry learning. In what follows, 
I specify how each study provides empirical contributions in this regard: 
Study I identifies a trajectory of conceptual development in a group of students, and 
then examines how the conceptual connections between artifacts and conceptual 
accounts emerge as a function of the turn-taking organization of talk-in-interaction. 
In doing so, it provides accounts of cognitive phenomena that are often evoked to 
describe individual aspects of interaction—recognition, inference, and applying 
theoretical knowledge—and describes these instead as time-extended, collective 
achievements. We show how recognizing a digital simulation as being an instance of 
a scientific law is not a synchronic act of a rational mind by means of which digital 
simulation and scientific law are conceptualized as being similar or related. Rather, 
recognizing is the beginning of a larger act of perception, which is itself a 
developmental phenomenon. Rather than a conceptualization of similarities, there is 
first what Nemirovsky (2011) calls an episodic feeling, that is, a bodily and context-
bound sense of “having-been-there” (p. 311). It is only as part of addressing and 
being addressed by others during conversation that the initial connection comes to be 
developed as a conceptual one. In the process, we provide evidence that the students 
are as much active as they are subjected to the unexpected material and 
conversational events. Similarly, in drawing an inference as the students compare a 
hands-on experiment with the digital simulation, their prior understanding of the 
connection is not immediately “bootstrapped,” as mainstream research characterizes 
it (Gentner, 2010). Rather, elaborating on an initially identified similarity between 
two events in the curricular trajectory brings about an indeterminate situation (in 
Dewey’s sense) that leads to further bodily and material inquiry that transforms the 
objective situation. It is in transforming the situation and thereby being affected by 
the new objective circumstances that new conceptual understandings of the 
connection among events, artifacts, and the scientific law emerge. It is, therefore, not 
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that an inference brings about a new situation where new conceptual understandings 
are in place. Rather, an initial sense of similarity motivates action that transforms the 
situation, which in turn allows for the eventual achievement of a new conceptual way 
of accounting for a new existing order. Inference, as a cognitive process, does not 
precede, but rather is the outcome of, a larger unit of activity. The study, thus, 
provides us with an alternative account of the role that individuals play in 
constituting cognitive phenomena that highlights both the performative and the 
affective aspects of situated action. Individuals constitute and are constituted by the 
establishment of conceptual coherence because they are subject to the objective 
changes that bodily activity brings about in their attunement to the accountable, 
collective organization of activity. 
Study II (Jornet & Roth, in press) examines how a number of analogical and digital 
artifacts become signs in and through social transactions that involve a teacher and a 
group of students. According to the transactional analytical framework that guides the 
study, we approach any material aspect involved in the constitution of conceptual 
coherence from the first-time-through perspective of the learners, who do not yet 
know the symbolic functions that those material aspects may have in the scientific 
and disciplinary discourses. Throughout the study, we show the processes by means 
of which a syntax that connects events and materials emerges in and through bodily 
social transactions and is not just a part of talk. We describe how pointing, gazing, 
and other deictic (pointing) gestures are the first fleshly forms by means of which the 
materials in the different situations come to be structured. These carnal aspects, 
therefore, emerge as a precondition for semiotic mediation to take place and, 
therefore, become integral to the process by means of which conceptual connections 
across talk, artifacts, and representations are drawn. As bodily orientation and action 
change, so do the structures that come to be the object of talk, even when the 
presentations and materials remain “the same.” The analyses also describe how, as 
soon as participants come to use language to account for situational aspects made 
salient through bodily action, opportunities for making those situational aspects 
present again (that is, to become represented) emerge. However, language does not 
just bring already known concepts by means of which participants can make sense of 
the conceptual connections. Using language also brings about new contextual re-
configuration in which participants demonstrably orient to “a particular, locally 
relevant array of semiotic fields” (Goodwin, 2000, p. 1490). Those fields are 
constituted, in turn, by new orientations towards inquiry, where participants still need 
to perform bodily and discursive joint work to establish the adequacy of the emerging 
relations between forms of talking and immediate aspects of the material situations. 
As part of this work, the role of the teacher, who facilitates the emergence of 
particular structures and connections and the loss of others, appears as fundamental 
for the achievement of coherence that is in line with the curricular intentions. The 
findings thus suggest that an adequate understanding of teaching and learning with 
multiple representations requires an understanding of the pragmatics of joint action 
and of how the body and the materials come to form a unitary situation in the 
learners’ experience (Dewey, 1938; Roth & Jornet, 2014). The framework and 
findings are in line with other studies from ecological perspectives, which emphasize 
the role of the different representations and inscriptions involved in science learning 
as structuring resources (Furberg et al., 2013), but also expand the latter by bringing 
attention to and providing accounts of how performative aspects of activity are 
constitutive and not just epiphenomenal during episodes of conceptual development. 
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Study III, building upon findings reported in the other two studies, provides empirical 
and conceptual contributions to the study of the joint work involved in the 
microgenesis of conceptual coherence achievements in science education. In 
particular, it specifies the work that teachers and students jointly perform during 
question-answer sequences of classroom talk so that video recordings of the students’ 
experimentation with materials come to be accounted in terms of the conceptual 
content of the science curriculum. The analyses show how gestures, prosody, body 
orientations, and other aspects of the arrangement of material resources during 
conversation become important resources for the participants to achieve coherent 
topics during question-answer sequences despite the gap that exists between the 
teacher’s knowledge about the scientific conceptual aspects involved in the 
experiments and the students’ current knowledge that does not and cannot yet 
foreshadow what they will be knowing in the end. The analyses show how bodily 
resources that are produced in and through questioning sequences embody an internal 
coherence that is demonstrably shown in several occasions by and for the 
participants. To facilitate that conceptual connections between the students’ prior 
experiments and scientific accounts thereof emerge in the classroom, the teacher 
enacts narrative spaces by assembling indexical, iconic, and metaphoric gestures that 
exploit, in a consistent manner, aspects of the immediate material environment across 
occasions. The study thus expands a long tradition of empirical studies on the role of 
teacher questioning in facilitating that students connect everyday experiences with 
conceptual aspects of the (science) curriculum by exploring the bodily and 
performative dimensions involved in the organization of IRE/F question-answer 
sequences. In doing so, the study also expands the recent literature concerned with 
the role of the body in bringing forth conceptual understandings in the classroom 
(Alibali et al., 2014; Novack et al., 2014; Pozzer-Ardenghi & Roth, 2010). 
Analyzing transaction from the first-time-through perspective of the participants. 
A final contribution that I wish to elaborate on involves the methods used as part of 
this thesis. Throughout my studies, and guided by prior works produced by my 
supervisors (e.g., Krange & Ludvigsen, 2009; Roth, 2013a, 2013b), I have paid 
particular attention to the relation between the theoretical premises and the analytical 
practices implied in my work when approaching the empirical materials. Whereas no 
new methods have been developed in this dissertation, my approach to the empirical 
analyses involves drawing from diverse techniques and traditions that are not 
commonly brought together in studies on inquiry-based learning. Although most of 
the aspects in this regard were thoroughly discussed in chapter 4, I wish to clarify 
here the ways in which these different methods and traditions have been combined. 
The analytical framework developed throughout this thesis implies an attention to the 
genetic process by means of which immediate aspects of experience acquire 
signifying function in and through joint activity. This poses important challenges in 
the way we, as researchers, need to approach analyses of actual interaction. It implies 
that any assumption about what particular actions, utterances, artifacts, and 
representations “mean” as cultural tools needs to be set aside and instead requires 
taking a first-time-through perspective of the participants. This involves the practice 
of bracketing, which I described thoroughly in chapter 4. Importantly, as noted in that 
chapter, bracketing does not mean that we, as researchers, pretend to be somehow 
culturally agnostic. Preconceptions and interests regarding particular cultural 
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practices or outcomes are important to enable a first approach to the data, and to 
identify events of interest to the research questions. However, once particular 
practices and events are identified and further scrutinized to select relevant pieces of 
data, bracketing implies taking the perspective of the participants to understand how 
material elements first appear to the participants, and how they become implicated as 
significant aspects of their own everyday order and life. 
To achieve ethnographically adequate descriptions (McDermott et al., 1978) of 
activity from the point of view of the participants, throughout the empirical studies in 
this thesis, and as part of a video-based interaction analysis framework (Jordan & 
Henderson, 1995; Derry et al., 2010), we have used analytical notions and techniques 
developed as part of the ethnomethodological program of sociological research 
(Garfinkel, 1967) and the empirical work of conversation analysis (Sacks, Schegloff, 
& Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 2007). This includes (a) the policy of bracketing our 
own preconceptions and interpretative frames when approaching interactional data 
and (b) relying on the next-turn proof procedure rather than on a priori categories or 
institutional knowledge to validate our observations about what the participants are 
saying or doing with regard to particular aspects of their context. The use of the latter 
methodological approaches, however, has been problematized in the literature on 
research about learning, and particularly from a sociocultural perspective that I 
nonetheless consider fully consistent with the approach taken in my studies (Mäkitalo 
& Säljö, 2002; Mercer & Littleton, 2007). In this regard, a concern has been that 
ethnomethodological analyses do not consider the historical aspects of the cultural 
tools involved in social interaction, such as institutional ways of talking. The concern 
is that, if researchers are interested in investigating the temporal emergence of 
conceptual competences in and across learning activities in educational contexts,   
methods for analyzing discourse in which the analyst only attends to the 
relationship between contributions made by participants in one recorded 
conversation, without applying available information about previous related 
interactions and historically contextual knowledge shared by participants 
(as seems to have been advocated by some conversation analysts…) would 
simply not work. (Mercer & Littleton, 2007, p. 116) 
However, ethnomethodologically informed analytical approaches do not necessarily 
imply that analyses must ignore the “historically contextual knowledge shared by 
participants.” On the contrary, one explicit analytical policy is that analysts must 
share with the participants the social competences exhibited during interaction. As 
McDermott et al. (1978) note,  
people manage to know for sure what is going on only in relation to specific 
interactional environments, and they usually know a great deal about these 
environments because they have helped to construct them as predictable 
contexts for plying whatever it is that they know. Such framing takes 
considerable work, and it is by that work that we are able to locate what it is 
that members of a group are up to at any given time. (p. 247) 
The aim of the analyst, thus, is not to ignore such knowledge, but to “use the ways 
members have of making clear to each other and to themselves what is going on to 
locate to our own satisfaction an account of what it is that they are doing with each 
other” (p. 247). However, the policy requires specifying the work by means of which 
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such knowledge is actually shared and made relevant during activity rather than 
providing it as encapsulated in already given categories of which the evidence in the 
data materials is not articulated. Key to understanding how ethnomethodologically 
informed analyses may fit in the broader ecological framework elaborated through 
this thesis, which aims to retain a focus on signs and tool mediation, is to 
acknowledge that often, sociocultural and ethnomethodological approaches focus on 
different levels of analysis. Thus, as Mäkitalo and Säljö (2002) note, 
“ethnomethodologists have an interest in unpacking members’ methods for 
accomplishing social interaction in terms of some basic fundamental patterns of the 
organization of talk … and of the orderliness of categories … in conversations,” 
whereas “sociocultural studies … analyze the sociogenesis, meaning and 
consequences of social action in society” (p. 65). 
In the analytical work developed throughout this thesis, these two alternate interests 
are joined within a transactional perspective. In this regard, the notion of unit 
analysis, according to which events of development are to be understood by reference 
to their internal constitution and organization, has served us for elaborating how the 
endogenous methods by means of which situated action is organized relate to the 
establishment of longer episodes of sign-mediated activity that are the minimal unit 
of analysis. The notion of experience as having social and temporal extension has 
served us, in turn, to elaborate how individuals come to constitute and be constituted 
through the moment-by-moment actions as part of episodes of meaningful, 
institutional (science learning) activity. In addition, as Roth notes in several works 
(Roth, 2011, 2013b), conversation analysis techniques are consistent with the 
dialogical premises based on authors such as Bakhtin (1981), which underlie much of 
current sociocultural research in that they take two consecutive turns during 
conversation—i.e., a social relation—as the minimal possible unit of analysis. As a 
result, the studies included in this dissertation expand the analytical possibilities for 
studying how conceptual relations of coherence emerge and develop throughout 
inquiry-based learning activities from the perspective of the learners, who do not yet 
master the required conceptual competences to perform competent scientific practice, 
but who have an array of everyday, bodily, and linguistic competences to engage 
with others and with materials. 
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Appendix 1: Transcription 
conventions 
,?;.  Punctuation marks are used to indicate pitch toward end of an audible unit: 
slightly rising, strongly rising, slightly falling, and strongly falling 
[ ]  Square brackets indicate beginning and end, respectively, of 
overlapping speech 
(.)  Clearly audible pause of unmeasured length, evt. time in seconds (e.g. 
(2.0)) 
(())     My own comments and observations 
(??)  Words missing. As many ”?” as words missing 
-   dash marks unfinished or interrupted utterance. 
(h)   laughing inserted in talk 
word  an underlined word signal stress in the spoken utterance  
°word° a word pronounced at low volume 
wo:rd  colon indicates the prolonging of the prior letter or syllab 
<word> brackets pointing outward indicate word or phrase spoken more 
slowly than   the surrounding discourse 
>word< brackets pointing inward indicate word or phrase spoken more quickly 
than the   surrounding discourse 
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